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ASSEMBLY BILL 2223 (MOORE) --- PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT ISSUES 
On Tuesday, December 17, the Senate Local Government Commit-
tee held an interim hearing on Assembly Bill 2223 by Assem-
blywoman Gwen Moore, relating to the Permit Streamlining Act. 
Four state senators heard attorneys, planners, lobbyists, and 
citizen activists explore the relationship between the Permit 
Streamlining Act and the California Environmental Quality Act 
(CEQA). The Committee members also heard the witnesses des-
cribe other problems with the Permit Streamlining Act. 
The four Committee members who attended the hearing were: 
Senator Marian Bergeson, Chairman 
Senator Ruben s. Ayala, Vice Chair 
Senator Charles M. Calderon 
Senator Newton R. Russell 
In addition, Assemblywoman Gwen Moore, author of AB 2223, 
joined the Senators to explore these issues. 
The hearing began at 1:45 p.m. and finished at 4:45 p.m. 
About 30 people attended the hearing in the State Capitol. 
This summary report contains the Committee staff's explana-
tions of what happened at the hearing (the white pages), re-
prints the briefing paper that the staff wrote for the Com-
mittee (the blue pages), and reproduces the written materials 
that the witnesses and others submitted (the yellow pages). 
STAFF FINDINGS 
Any attempt to distill an entire afternoon's discussion and 
dialogue into a few findings glosses over important details. 
But after carefully reviewing the oral testimony and written 
presentations, the Committee's staff identified these key 
findings: 
• The deemed approved provision of the Permit 
Streamlining Act is not working. 
• Project applicants are dissatisfied because the 
Act does not deliver the certainty it seemed to 
promise. 
• Public officials are dissatisfied because the 
deadlines are too rigid and they lose the power 
to mitigate problems. 
• citizens are dissatisfied because they suffer 
when public officials miss the deadlines. 
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• Despite their common dissatisfaction, appli-
cants, officials, and citizens can't agree on 
the way to harmonize the deadlines of the Permit 
Streamlining Act and CEQA. 
• However, there is growing interest in "tolling" 
the Permit Streamlining Act's deadline until the 
CEQA process is finished. 
• Besides deadlines, other problems exist and re-
forms are possible. 
THE WITNESSES 
Ten people spoke at the Committee's hearing. Seven of them 
submitted written comments which appear in the yellow pages. 
Robert E. Merritt• 
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen 
Franklin P. Eberhard* 
Los Angeles City Planning Department 
Bill Christopher• 
People for Livable and Active Neighborhoods in Los Angeles 
(PLAN-LA) 
Debra L. Bowen• 
Coastal Area Support Team (COAST) 
Sherman L. Stacey• 




League of California Cities 
Dwight Hansen 
California Building Industry Association 
James P. Corn 
California Council of Civil Engineers and Land Surveyors 
James G. Moose• 
Remy & Thomas 




John Powers, Conner, and 
Coastal Area Support Team (COAST) 
Honorable Ruth Galanter 
Los Angeles City Councilwoman 
L. Bowen 
wrote to the 
low pages. 
Jackie Freedman, Laura Lake, and 
Friends of Westwood, Inc. 
0 1 Brien 
LEGISLATORS• INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
senator Bergeson opened the hearing by concentrating the 
islators' attention on the central policy question: "what is 
the relationship between the deadlines in the Permit Stream-
lining Act and the California Environmental Quality Act?" 
The Senator reminded the witnesses that her Committee is "not 
here to judge whether the city of Los Angeles bent or broke 
the law in its handling of the 1 601 Ocean Front Walk' pro-
ject." Instead, she urged the Committee to focus on the 
policy implications of that case. "We need to think about 
how the one-year deadline in CEQA for finishing an EIR should 
fit with the Permit Streamlining Act's one-year deadline for 
acting on projects." 
Assemblywoman Moore thanked the Committee for taking time to 
study her AB 2223 and to sort out the relationship between 
the two statutes. Her intent is to find a way that the CEQA 
and Permit Streamlining Act processes can "run concurrently." 
Public officials need to consider environmental issues when 
they approve permits. She challenged the witnesses to bal-
ance the rights of property owners with the general public 
welfare. 
11THE DREAM AND THE REALITY" 
The Committee's lead witness was San Francisco attorney 
Robert E. Merritt, an editor of the Land Use Forum and author 
of "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the Reality." 
Rather than advocating a particular view, Merritt served the 
Committee as an expert policy advisor. Drawing from his re-
cent article (reprinted in the blue pages) , Merritt outlined 
a brief history of the Permit Streamlining Act and its two 
stages: the application stage and the deemed approval stage. 
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Merritt then sketched "four major problems" which he claimed 
"prevent the Permit Streamlining Act from accomplishing the 
objective of speedy processing of land use entitlements." 
• The Act does not apply to legislative actions. 
e There can be no deemed approval under the Act unless 
the project is consistent with underlying 
e The Act may fail constitutional due process require-
ments because it does not provide for hearings. 
e If deemed approval occurs, it still is not clear 
exactly what has been approved. 
Turning to the relationship between the Permit Streamlining 
Act and CEQA, Merritt reviewed the two statutes' time dead-
lines. He conceded that "it is quite easy" to reach the 
deemed approval deadline without having a completed EIR. To 
avoid this perverse result, Merritt described three possible 
alternatives to the Committee. 
First, the Legislature could declare that without a cer-
tified EIR, a project cannot be deemed approved. 11 AB 2223 
says this in no uncertain terms." 
Second, the Legislature could impose a "real" one-year 
deadline on the preparation of an EIR and allow a project to 
be deemed approved even if the agency is not yet completed. 
Third, the Legislature could suspend ("toll") the deemed 
approval until 45 days after the agency completes CEQA 
process. 
Merritt noted that his article suggests the third alternative 
as a solution to a similar situation involving legislative 
actions. At the end of the hearing, Merritt explained the 
Legislature's alternatives and described four other problems 
with the statute; see pages 8 and 9. 
DEEMED APPROVED 
The key struggle in what John Powers called the "disharmony" 
between the Permit streamlining Act and CEQA is the deemed 
approved provision. "It's time to reconsider the Permit 
Streamlining Act," asserted Ernie Silva, acknowledging the 
continuing conflict between the two statutes. To Silva, the 
deemed approved provision moots CEQA's requirements for en-
vironmental balancing. 
Landowners' constitutional rights may be at risk if a deemed 
approved project proceeds without a public hearing, said Jim 
Moose. The constitutional defect overshadows other problems. 
For Frank Eberhard, 
political access to 
avoid the usual 
Debra Bowen agreed, arguing 
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izens their 
lows projects to 
and exactions. 
provision imposes a penalty , not on the 
public agency which missed the statutory The most 
controversial projects take the longest to review, she said, 
but they are the most likely to be deemed approved. Perhaps 
the Legislature should replace the deemed approved provision 
with the ability to reverse a poor decis Ernie 
Silva. 
Darryl Young told the legislators that there should be no 
automatic approval of any project would rather not 
have any statutory deadlines. Responding to senator Berge-
son, Young conceded that he did not have a solution to com-
pleting projects in a timely manner. 
Postponing the deemed approval until after an agency com-
pletes its CEQA process would mean "no automatic approval at 
all" under the Permit Streamlining Act, according to Jim 
Corn. The Legislature addressed the Act to governments that 
fail to act, said Dwight Hansen. So eliminating the deemed 
approved provision would gut the statute's impact. 
More discussion on t limits and deadlines appears below. 
For cities the ze of Los Angeles, Frank Eberhard contended 
that the Permit Streamlining Act's 11 time limits are too 
stringent" for controversial or complex projects. When 
Senator Bergeson asked if state law needed "more explicit 
deadlines," Eberhard said, "Not really." A better approach 
is for the Legislature to "set a timeline after the EIR is 
done to approve the project." Assemblywoman Moore observed 
that Eberhard's approach "delays the process" because there 
would be no final deadline for 
Bill Christopher expla that to these deadlines, 
Los Angeles city officials an application 
complete (under the Permit Streamlining Act until CEQA 
process has been completed. senator Bergeson responded by 
reemphasizing her commitment to the principle that there 
"should be a time when everything is certain." Senator Ayala 
agreed. Debra Bowen said that having a "stringent deadline 
for completing the CEQA process also ignores the reality that 
the larger a project, and the more adverse its impacts, the 
longer the CEQA review takes." Bowen suggested that AB 2223 
include a defined time limit for CEQA review or allow the de-
veloper and the agency to decide together what a feasible 
deadline should be. 
After offering the lators a chart showing both Acts' 
time deadlines, Ernie Silva sa that "existing time limits 
can be unworkable." Silva's testimony sliced the one-year 
deadline into its component parts, showing how little time 
local staffers have to review proposed projects. A one-year 
timeline works for less controversial projects, Silva said. 
The problem comes with the more complicated proposals. 
Senator Calderon observed that the Legislature should not 
slow down the process just to let cities catch up. If there 
are deadline problems, "maybe we should have arbitrators de-
cide" these cases. 
"Cities want to approve projects" because they want develop-
ment, Silva said. City officials find it "tough" to be 
caught between "the NIMBYs" and the developers. senator 
Russell noted that "if you're the person paying the bills," 
even a one-year deadline "is a long time. 11 
The statutory analysis by Jim Moose exposed the legislators 
to several different conflicting interpretations of these 
deadlines. 
But emphasizing the importance of the statutory deadlines, 
Sherman Stacey reminded the legislators of the bipartisan 
support that accompanied the 1977 passage of the Permit 
Streamlining Act. In signing the bill, Stacey reported that 
Governor Jerry Brown said that the Act's one-year deadline 
"helps guarantee that every proposed development receives a 
prompt and fair hearing." The result, Stacey said, is that 
11 99% of all projects meet the time deadlines of the Act." Of 
course, timetable will be viewed differently from each s 
added Dwight Hansen. 
Because of "judicial disfavor," Jim Corn acknowledged that 
automatic approvals are "not terribly efficacious. 11 However, 
he does not favor their repeal because the threat of an auto-
matic approval "still has sufficient validity to convince 
some agencies to act within the time limits." Rather than 
repeal the deadlines, Corn wanted reforms. CEQA and the Per-
mit Streamlining Act should "run concurrently and be consis-
tent." He wanted the Legis to: 
• Cut the basic deadline from one year to six months 
with the opportunity for one additional six-month extension. 
Corn argued that the current one-year deadline makes every 
project a one-year effort. 
• Require the agency to refund the applicant's proces-
sing fees if the agency violates the statutory time limits. 







City of Los 
the 601 Ocean 
chance when 
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the absence of findings 
Ernie Silva said that 
ject is deemed approved 
come after the 
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of an 
ile" because it 
When Assemblywoman Moore 
solved if agencies took mit 
started, Frank Eberhard explained 
re-
project 
process was necessary identify and 
to explore the mitigat 
Testimony from Jim Moose explained the situation behind 
Patterson v. City of Sausalito, a 1 in 
which represents City. The 
project was deemed precisely 
proposed by the fact 
EIR showed that 
mental 
could have 





Bob Merritt the 
ling as a to ize 
stan-
appli-
be," he asserted. 
both Acts. The Legislature could "suspend the deemed ap-
proval until a fixed time elapses (e.g. 45 days) after the 
CEQA process is ete," Merritt suggested. 
Frank Eberhard agreed with alternative of tolling but 
suggested a 60-day time limit. Bill Christopher and Ernie 
Silva acknowledged that tolling was one alternative to the 
current conflict between the Acts. Debra Bowen told the 
Committee that AB 2223 a infers a variation on the 
tolling option by ies to finish their CEQA 
documents before act underlying proposal. 
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SOME FINAL WORDS OF ADVICE 
As the hearing closed, Senator Bergeson invited Bob Merritt 
to provide the Committee with more general advice on the Per-
mit Streamlining Act. Merritt began by noting that the 
ed approved concept probably seemed "quick and efficient" to 
legislators when it was first enacted in 1977. But the con-
cept has become "complicated and proven unworkable." 
Merritt then suggested dropping the deemed approval provision 
in favor of other approaches: 
• Quick court action. Merritt's first alternative was 
a summary judicial proceeding. If an agency misses its dead-
line, the developer could ask the court for 11 a preemptory 
writ of mandate directing the agency to act on the applica-
tion." The Act could lay out the necessary legal tools and 
forms to speed its implementation. The court could act on 
written pleadings, without oral argument. The order could be 
"non-appealable." Successful applicants could recover their 
attorneys' fees and possibly even damages if "the agency 
acted capriciously." 
According to Merritt, the key is a judicial remedy that is: 
1. Limited to a single issue (the deadline). 
2. Readily available. 
3. Results in cost to the agency for dragging its feet. 
• With hearings. Terming it "more moderate proposal," 
Merritt offered a second alternative that followed the first 
suggestion but required a hearing. But, he conceded, if the 
agency does not act after the hearing, the current difficul-
ties still remain. 
• Legislative vs. adjudicatory. Merritt's third sug-
gestion was to eliminate the distinction between legislative 
and adjudicatory decisions. The Act could require agencies 
to impose deadlines on their legislative decisions if they 
apply to specific locations; e.g., site-specific rezoning re-
quests. 
• Other improvements. Contending that it is possible 
to streamline the Streamlining Act, Merritt offered a series 
of specific changes to improve the implementation of the 
statute: 
* Standard cover page for applications. 
* Eliminate the hazardous waste statement. 
* Standard submittal when requirements are missing. 
* Standard conditions for deemed approved projects. 
Merritt concluded 
be simpler the 
cess. 11 But ever 




NOTE: I could not have prepared this summary report without 
the help of my colleagues Dave ff and Jen Hilger. I needed 
their help at a very difficult time. I am very grateful. 
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ASSEMBLY BILL 2223 {MOORE): PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT ISSUES 
On July 17, the Senate Local Government Committee postponed 
action on Assemblywoman Gwen Moore's Assembly Bill 2223. on 
a motion made by Senator Newton Russell, the Committee voted 
5-0 to hold AB 2223 for further study during the Legisla-
ture's interim recess. Senator Marian Bergeson, the Commit-
tee's Chairman, has called a hearing on AB 2223 for Tuesday 
afternoon, December 17. 
AB 2223 IN SUMMARY 
Assembly Bill 2223 says that a development permit shall be 
"deemed approved" under the Permit Streamlining Act only if 
the public agency has complied with the California Environ-
mental Quality Act. The bill's text appears in Appendix A. 
To understand the bill, legislators must also know that: 
• The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 
requires public officials to review projects' en-
vironmental effects before they act. 
• Environmental impact reports (EIRs) must be 
ready within one year. 
• The Permit Streamlining Act requires officials 
to act on development projects within one year. 
• If officials fail to act within a year, the Per-
mit Streamlining Act says that a project is "deemed 
approved." 
• The "deemed approved" provision of the Permit 
Streamlining Act does not apply to EIRs. 
• Los Angeles City officials agreed that permits 
for a Venice mini-mall were deemed approved even 
though they had not completed the CEQA process. 
• Assemblywoman Moore introduced AB 2223 to pre-
vent this situation from happening again. 
Briefing paper. To prepare state legislators and the wit-
nesses for their December 17 discussions, this staff briefing 
paper explains: 
1. The origins and workings of the California Environmental 
Quality Act and the Permit Streamlining Act. 
2. How the courts have interpreted these laws. 
3. The specific situation in Los Angeles that prompted 
Assemblywoman Moore to introduce her bill. 
The briefing paper then frames the central policy question 
and offers three alternative answers. In addition, this 
paper contains two appendices: 
Appendix A is the text of Assembly Bill 2223, as amended 
in the Senate on July 14, 1991. 
Appendix B reprints an excellent commentary by Robert E. 
Merritt, "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the 
Reality." 
THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 
Familiarly known as "CEQA," the 1970 California Environmental 
Quality Act requires state and local agencies to review the 
environmental effects of projects before they make decisions. 
If a project may have adverse environmental effects, public 
officials must avoid the effects, mitigate the effects, or 
proceed anyway in light of overriding concerns. Although 
easily described, determining a project's environmental ef-
fects can be complicated in practice. 
Process. Officials must first determine whether their deci-
sion is a project which is subject to CEQA. Both the Act and 
its interpretive regulations, the CEQA Guidelines, exempt 
certain types of projects. If a project is not exempt, offi-
cials conduct an initial study to discover whether the pro-
ject may have significant adverse environmental effects. If 
there are no significant effects, the agency fulfills its 
CEQA obligation by issuing a negative declaration. But if 
there may be significant effects, officials must prepare an 
environmental impact report (EIR). After circulating a draft 
EIR and receiving public comments, the agency completes and 
certifies the final EIR. For each significant effect, the 
agency must avoid it, mitigate it, or adopt a finding that 
there are social or economic considerations that override the 
environmental effect. 
Deadlines. CEQA sets several deadlines for public officials 
to act, but one deadline is particularly important in under-
standing AB 2223. Every state and local agency must set a 
deadline for completing its environmental documents. The 
maximum deadline for EIRs is one year, measured from the date 
that the agency accepted the project application as complete. 
The maximum deadline for negative declarations is 105 days. 
The statute allows public agencies to provide "reasonable" 
time extensions for "compelling circumstances," and the CEQA 
Guidelines permit one 90-day extension. But the statute bans 
the earlier practice of rejecting applications unless they 
agree to waive the time deadline {SB 523, Russell, 1987). 
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THE PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT 
Responding to the political controversy surrounding Dow Chem-
ical Company's problems in getting permits to build a chemi-
cal plant in Solano County, the Legislature passed the Permit 
Streamlining Act (AB 884, McCarthy, 1977). The Legislature 
wanted officials "to expedite decisions" on projects. 
Process. The Act applies to every "development project," a 
term which includes entitlements and permits to construct, 
but not permits to operate. Nor does it include ministerial 
(non-discretionary) permits. The Act does not apply to leg-
islative decisions, such as general plan and zoning adoptions 
and amendments and LAFCO boundary changes. For example, a 
discretionary conditional use permit is a "development pro-
ject" subject to the Permit Streamlining Act, but a minis-
terial building permit is not. 
The process begins when a proponent files an application for 
a development project with a public agency. The agency has 
30 days to determine if the application is complete. Public 
officials must tell the applicant what criteria they use to 
decide whether an application is complete. If the agency 
finds that the application is not complete, officials must 
tell the applicant what's missing. If the agency fails to 
respond within 30 days, then the Act says that the applica-
tion "shall be deemed complete." 
Deadlines. If CEQA requires an EIR for the project, the Per-
mit Streamlining Act requires the agency to approve or disap-
prove the application within one year, measured from the date 
that the agency accepted the project application as complete. 
The Act allows one 90-day extension if both the agency and 
the applicant consent. If the agency has extended CEQA's 
deadline to complete an EIR, the Permit Streamlining Act re-
quires officials to act on the project within 90 days of cer-
tifying the EIR (SB 413, Davis, 1983). Further, the Act ex-
plains, these statutory deadlines are "maximum time limits" 
and directs public agencies to act sooner ''if possible." 
Deemed approved. If the public agency does not act within 
the statutory time limits, the Act says that ''failure to act 
shall be deemed approval" of the project. In other words, 
inaction leads to approval. According to Robert Merritt, a 
close observer of this statute, "automatic approval lies at 
the heart of the Act." But, Merritt notes: 
In the brief 13 years since enactment, numerous 
appellate court decision have interpreted the Act. 
Only two cases ... have upheld automatic approval. 
For the most part, the judiciary has been hostile 
to the Act, severely limiting its application. 
Merritt's excellent review, "The Permit Streamlining Act: The 
Dream and the Reality," appears in Appendix B. 
WHAT THE COURTS SAY 
Knowing what the Legislature has done, now it is important 
to understand how the courts interpret the Permit Stream-
lining Act. 
The "Landi" decision. Just what the "deemed approved" pro-
vision applies to and what it does not affect was one of the 
earliest issues in implementing the Permit Streamlining Act. 
California's land use laws generally distinguish between leg-
islative acts which make policies and adjudicatory decisions 
which apply the policies to specific situations. The adop-
tion and amendment of general plans and zoning ordinances are 
legislative acts which set land use policies. The approval 
of development projects (e.g., subdivision maps, conditional 
use permits) are adjudicatory decisions. 
The court used this distinction in the 1983 decision Landi v. 
County of Monterey. When asked if the Permit Streamlining 
Act applied to the rezoning of 18 acres, the Court said that 
the law only covers adjudicatory actions. Therefore, the 
Act's deadlines and its central "deemed approved" concept do 
not apply to legislative decisions such as zoning ordinances 
and their underlying general plans. In his article, Merritt 
shows how other courts have applied the Landi decision. 
The "Palmer" decision. The 1986 case Palmer v. City of ojai 
upheld the automatic approval of a permit because city offi-
cials failed to meet the Permit Streamlining Act's deadlines. 
But after the Palmer decision, attorneys became worried that 
adjacent landowners' rights to due process could be violated. 
If the Act resulted in automatic approvals without adjacent 
landowners receiving notice, the landowners would be deprived 
of their constitutional right to due process; public notice 
of an action affecting their property. Another court reached 
this conclusion in a 1989 case, Selinger v. City Council. 
Alerted by attorneys to anticipate the problem, the Legisla-
ture responded to the Palmer decision in 1987 by amending the 
Act to require that public notice be given before a permit 
can be deemed approved. The Act now allows the applicant to 
give 60 days of public notice, then the permit is deemed ap-
proved (AB 1486, Sher, 1987). Merritt, however, worries that 
the Act remains constitutionally insufficient despite this 
reform. Although adjacent landowners now have a way to re-
ceive public notice, they still do not have an opportunity to 
be heard at a public hearing. 
The "Land Waste Management" decision. When interpreting two 
statutes which apply to the same case, the courts often write 
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about the need to harmonize the laws; to read them together 
so that they both make sense. The August 1990 case Land 
Waste Management v. Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors 
interpreted the relationship between the "deemed approved" 
provision in the Permit Streamlining Act and CEQA's require-
ment to complete an EIR. 
The decision held that CEQA does not automatically certify an 
EIR even if officials miss the statutory one-year deadline. 
Further, the court said that the automatic approval provi-
sions of the Permit Streamlining Act do not apply to CEQA. 
"Nowhere in CEQA is there any provision for automatic or 
'deemed' certification of EIRs if action is not taken within 
one year." The Court's decision continued: 
Moreover, the Permit Streamlining Act, which was 
enacted after CEQA, did not add any automatic ap-
proval provision for EIRs, and did not mention EIR 
certification in the automatic approval provisions 
which it did set forth. The Legislature must be 
presumed to have been aware of the CEQA time limits 
at the time it enacted the Permit Streamlining Act, 
indicating its tacit intent to leave the law as it 
stands. (citations] In view of the Legislature's 
failure to enact such a drastic provision, we now 
decline to read it into CEQA ourselves. 
Reviewing the Land Waste Management case, Merritt comments: 
Implied, but unstated, was rejection of the concept 
of a deemed approval without compliance with CEQA. 
Unfortunately, Land Waste Management does not ad-
dress the question of how the time periods for 
action on adjudicatory permits are affected when 
the agency ... fails to complete the CEQA process. 
Merritt's article goes on to note that exactly this kind of 
conflict between CEQA and the Permit Streamlining Act sur-
faced in a land use controversy in the City of Los Angeles 
neighborhood of Venice. 
601 OCEAN FRONT WALK 
In mid-October 1988, Stephen M. Blanchard filed four appli-
cations with the city of Los Angeles to develop his property 
at 601 Ocean Front Walk in the Venice area. Blanchard wanted 
to build a multi-story building with restaurants and retail 
stores. These applications "were deemed complete by the 
Planning Department" in late October. In November 1988, city 
planners told Blanchard that he needed to apply for two more 
city permits. By mid-January 1989, all of Blanchard's per-
mits "were 'deemed complete' by the City." 
city planners published and mailed notices of their April 
1989 public hearing before an Associate Zoning Administrator. 
In October 1989, the city staff issued a proposed "mitigated 
negative declaration" for the first set of Blanchard's appli-
cations. In November 1989, a neighbor protested the proposed 
negative declaration. In early December 1989, Blanchard's 
attorney asked the city to act on his client's applications, 
reminding the City of the Permit Streamlining Act's dead-
lines. In February 1990, the city staff issued another pro-
posed mitigated negative declaration; this time covering all 
of Blanchard's applications. In March 1990, the neighbor 
also protested this CEQA document. 
In mid-May 1990, Blanchard's attorney "demanded that the City 
immediately issue each of the permits." Because the City had 
failed to act within the one-year deadline of the Permit 
Streamlining Act, Blanchard's attorney claimed that the per-
mits had been deemed approved. In mid-July 1990, the Los 
Angeles City Attorney advised planners that it appeared that 
the permits were deemed approved. Later in July 1990, the 
Associate Zoning Administrator issued a formal ruling that 
Blanchard's six permits were all deemed approved. 
In early August 1990, the District Court of Appeal issued its 
Land Waste Management decision. The court said that the Per-
mit Streamlining Act's "deemed approved" provision does not 
apply to EIRs prepared under CEQA. 
In August 1990, the neighbor appealed the staff decision to 
the City's Board of Zoning Appeals. The Venice North Beach 
Coalition, a neighborhood group, sued the City, naming Blan-
chard as the real party in interest. The Coalition asked the 
Superior Court to reverse the city staff's ruling, to require 
the City to reconsider the permits, and to require the City 
to prepare an EIR. 
In early October 1990, the State Department of Justice, act-
ing in the name of then-Attorney General John Van de Kamp, 
told the city's Board of Zoning Appeals that the recent Land 
Waste Management decision was the controlling law. The 
state's attorney told city officials that they should reverse 
their Zoning Administrator's decision. 
In mid-October, the City's Board of Zoning Appeals overruled 
its Zoning Administrator, determined that the permits had not 
been deemed approved, and sent the issue back to the staff. 
In January 1991, Blanchard sued the City, asking the Superior 
Court to mandate city officials to issue his permits. Blan-
chard also filed a $20 million damage claim against the City. 
In March 1991, Assemblywoman Moore introduced her Assembly 
Bill 2223 at the request of Los Angeles city Councilmember 
Ruth Galanter who represents the Venice area. 
On May 31, 1991, the Los Angeles City Council signed a set-
tlement agreement with Blanchard and agreed to: 
1. Issue all six permits, subject to detailed conditions. 
2. Grant other permits, subject to detailed conditions. 
3. Not oppose permits issued by the Coastal Commission. 
4. Not oppose Alcoholic Beverage Control Board permits. 
5. Withdrawal of Blanchard's suit and damage claim. 
6. Mutual release of all claims and liabilities. 
7. Defend the agreement against legal challenges, including 
the Coalition's suit against the City. 
In early June 1991, the Assembly passed AB 2223 by the vote 
of 43-30. On July 17, the Senate Local Government Committee 
held the bill for interim study. 
In November 1991, the Coastal Commission approved its permits 
for Blanchard's project. 
The Coalition's suit against the City is still pending. The 
superior Court may hear the case before the end of 1991. 
THE POLICY QUESTION AND THE ALTERNATIVES 
Regardless of the legislative record, the court decisions, 
and even Venice project's contentious history, the 1991-92 
Legislature must confront this central policy question: 
What is the relationship between the deadlines in 
the Permit Streamlining Act and the California En-
vironmental Quality Act? 
The Committee members need to step back from the specifics of 
the bill and decide how CEQA's one-year deadline for finish-
ing an EIR should fit with the Permit Streamlining Act's one-
year deadline for acting on projects. The December 17 hear-
ing should give legislators at least three choices: 
1. CEQA first. Public officials must comply with CEQA 
before they act on development projects. In October 1990, 
advising Los Angeles officials, the Attorney General's office 
wrote: 
Allowing a project to be approved without compli-
ance with CEQA would result in the very "gamesman-
ship" the (Permit Streamlining Act] was designed to 
avoid. Applicants could attempt to delay the ap-
proval process as long as possible to gain approval 
without compliance with CEQA. Similarly, govern-
mental entities could avoid their CEQA obligations 
by failing to act on development applications, 
thereby allowing the project to be "deemed ap-
proved" without full compliance with CEQA. 
Other observers reject this approach, saying that the Attor-
ney General was "absolutely wrong." They argue that an agen-
cy could easily circumvent the "deemed approved" provision of 
the Permit Streamlining Act merely by dragging its feet in 
the CEQA process. As long as the agency never finishes its 
CEQA document, then the Permit Streamlining Act never ap-
plies. Officials could use CEQA to vitiate the Legislature's 
desire for a one-year deadline on development decisions. 
2. Same deadlines. Use the one-year deadlines in both 
CEQA and the Permit Streamlining Act. CEQA says that one 
year is long enough to complete an EIR, but it allows time 
extensions. The Permit Streamlining Act sets a one-year 
deadline on development decisions, but it allows one 90-day 
extension. Agencies can still disapprove projects that are 
harmful or unpopular. Neither law requires officials to ap-
prove development projects; they just have to make up their 
minds within the year. 
If a project is deemed approved under the Permit Streamlining 
Act without having a final CEQA document, it is still pos-
sible to challenge the project. CEQA already gives potential 
litigants 180 days to file lawsuits challenging projects for 
failure to have an EIR or negative declaration. 
Those who oppose this approach complain that it involves too 
much litigation, usually at the expense of neighborhood 
groups who are poorly financed. Why should citizens' groups 
have to sue public agencies when officials fail to follow the 
law? Shouldn't the Legislature instead place the legal bur-
den on public officials to follow the law? 
3. Tolling. Merritt's article suggests "tolling" as a 
third alternative. Noting that Permit Streamlining Act's 
deadlines do not apply to legislative decisions (the Landi 
and Land Waste Management cases), Merritt explores the pos-
sibility that the Act's one-year deadline should be suspended 
while officials finish their legislative decisions. 
In other words, if the required legislative action 
is not taken by the time the ... one-year time pe-
riod has run on the permit applications, the time 
is extended until the legislative action occurs. 
Thus, at the time of the legislative action, the 
agency will also be required to act on the permits. 
Similarly, Merritt suggests that the conflict between the 
CEQA and Permit Streamlining Act deadlines could be resolved 
by using "the tolling approach [to] breathe some life back 
into the Act." He argues that tolling would be more consis-
tent with the Act's original purpose and less drastic than 
having to wait for a final CEQA document. 
-OZO 
SOURCES 
In preparing this briefing paper, the most useful source was: 
Robert E. Merritt, "The Permit Streamlining Act: The 
Dream and the Reality," Land Use Forum, (Fall 1991). 
* * * * * * * 
The Committee's staff benefitted from the information and 
advice provided by: 
Don Collin, general counsel to the California Building 
Industry Association. 
Barry Fisher, attorney for the Venice North Beach Coalition. 
Gail Ruderman Feuer, Deputy Attorney General. 
Sherman L. Stacey, attorney for stephen M. Blanchard. 
* * * * * * * 
In addition, the briefing paper relied on: 
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. and Michael H. Zischke, "New 
Limits On Deemed Approval Of Projects Under The Permit 
Streamlining Act," McCutchen Update, Walnut Creek: McCutchen, 
Doyle, Brown & Enerson, September 28, 1990. 
William Fulton, Guide To California Planning, Pt. Arena: 
Solano Press Books, 1991. 
Michelle Marchetta Kenyon, "Courts Interpret Permit 
Streamlining Act," Public Law Bulletin, Oakland: McDonough, 
Holland & Allen, November 7, 1990. 
Michael H. Remy, et al., Guide to the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Fourth Edition, Pt. Arena: 
Solano Press Books, 1990. 
Ken Wilson, "'rhe Development Permit Process. Time 
Limits," in Longtin's California Land Use, 2nd Edition, James 
Longtin, ed., Malibu: Local Government Publication, 1987. 
* * * * * * * 
Peter Detwiler, consultant to the Senate Local Government 
Committee, wrote this briefing paper which was produced by 
Sharon Jennings, Committee Secretary. Peter and Sharon thank 





AMENDED IN SENATE JULY 14, 1991 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY ~IAY 24, 1991 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1991-92 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2223 
Introduced by Assembly Member Moore 
March 12, 1991 
An act to amend Section 65956 of the Government Code, 
relating to local planning. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 2223, as amended, Moore. Development project 
approval: California Environmental Quality Act. 
Existing law requires state and local agencies to hold 
hearings, give specified public notices, and approve or 
disapprove development projects, as defined, within specified 
times. Existing law specifically requires a public agency which 
is a lead agency, as defined, to approve or disapprove a 
development project within one year from the date an 
application requesting approval is received and accepted as 
complete by the lead agency and requires a responsible 
agency, as defined, to approve or disapprove development 
projects within 180 days of the date the lead agency takes 
action or within 180 days of the date on which the application 
is received and accepted as complete. In the event that a lead 
agency or responsible agency fails to meet these time limits 
and the public notice required by law has occurred, the 
failure is deemed to be approval of the permit application for 
the development project under existing law. 
This bill would also require compliance by the permitting 
agency with the California Environmental Quality Act prior 
to the permit application for the development project being 




responsible agency to meet those time limits. 
The bl11 would also state the intent of the Legislature in 
amending these provisions of existing law. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the St:lte of California do enact as follons: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 65956 of the Government Code 
2 is amended to read: 
3 65956. (a) If any provision of law requires the lead 
4 agency or responsible agency to provide public notice of 
5 the development project or to hold a public hearing, or 
6 both, on the development project and the agency has not 
7 provided the public notice or held the hearing, or both, 
8 at least 60 days prior to the expiration of the time limits 
9 established by Sections 65950 and 65952, the applicant or 
10 his or her representative may file an action pursuant to 
11 Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel the 
12 agency to provide the public notice or hold the hearing, 
13 or both, and the court shall give the proceedings 
14 preference over all other civil actions or proceedings, 
15 except older matters of the same character. 
16 (b) In the event that a lead agency or a responsible 
17 ;:tgency fails to act to approve or to disapprove a 
18 development project within the time limits required by 
19 this article, the failure to act shall be deemed approval of 
20 the permit application for the development project. 
21 However, the permit shall be deemed approved only if 
22 the public notice required by law has occurred and the 
23 permitting agency has complied with Division 13 
24 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public 
25 Resources Code. If the applicant has provided seven days 
26 advance notice to the permitting agency of the intent to 
27 provide public notice, then no earlier than 60 days from 
28 the expiration of the time limits established by Sections 
29 65950 and 65952, an applicant may provide the required 
30 public notice using the distribution information provided 
31 pursuant to Section 65941.5. If the applicant chooses to 
32 provide public notice, that notice shall include a 
W llO 
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1 description of the proposed development substantially 
2 similar to the descriptions which are commonly used in 
3 public notices by the permitting agency, the location of 
4 the proposed development, the permit application 
5 number, the name and address of the permitting agency, 
6 and a statement that the project shall be deemed 
7 approved if the permitting agency has not acted within 
8 60 days. If the applicant has provided the public notice 
9 required by this section, the time limit for action by the 
10 permitting agency shaH be extended to 60 days after the 
11 public notice is provided. If the applicant provides notice 
12 pursuant to this section, the permitting agency shall 
13 refund to the applicant any fees which were collected for 
14 providing notice and which were not used for that 
15 purpose. 
16 (c) Failure of an applicant to submit complete or 
17 adequate information pursuant to Sections 65943 to 65946, 
18 inclusive, may constitute grounds for disapproving a 
19 development project. 
20 (d) Nothing in this section shall diminish the 
21 permitting agency's legal responsibility to provide, 
22 where applicable, public notice and hearing before 
23 acting on a permit application. 
24 SEC. 2. In amending subdivision (b) of Section 65956 
25 of the Government Code this act, it is the intent of the 
26 Legislature that the time limits set by C11apter 4.5 
27 (commencing with Section 65920) of Division 1 of Title 
28 7 of the Government Code run concurrently with the 
29 time limits of the California Environmental Quality Act, 
30 Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the 
31 Public Resources Code. It is the further intent of the 
32 Legislature that no development project shall be deemed 
33 approved pursuant to Section 65956 of the Government 
34 Code until the lead agency and any responsible agency 
35 has filed the notice required by Section 21108 or Section 









The Dream and the Reality 
It was an idea wllosc time had come -~a way to cut through the 
labyrinth nl fl'll tape and dispel Cdilornia's antibusiness reputation. Em-
braced hy the Jerry Bmwn admini~tratiun and written hy Assembly Speak-
er Leo McCarthy, the hill creating the Permit Streamlining Act tGovl C 
~~651>20-h)%:1. l l tAB XX-tl received only one "no" vote as it sailed 
through the Legislature. It garnerL~d support from such diverse groups as 
tile California Clwmhcr 1ll Comllwrce. the California Manufacturers AsS\1-
ciation, tht: Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth. Almost everyone agreed 
that the land usc permitting process in California had gone completely \lUI 
1'1 contrPI. An editorial comment in the San Fmncisco Climnicle retlectcd 
the optimi~m behind the lcgislati(ln. "This spur to regulatory action is wel-
come and rca~on~thk, and u~nain tu assure potential business de\·clopers 
tilat Calil\lrnia \\'l'il'Ollll'S them." Sun Froncisco ( 'ltronicfe. rvhty 2ll, I 1J77. 
The single event that served as a catalyst to enactment ol the Permit 
Streamlining :\ct \V,lS tile withdrawal hy Dmv Chemical Company (JI 
applications to build a '!>50() million petrochemical plant at Cllllinsvillc. a 
'mall town cast ol San Francisco. Dow reportedly spent two and a hall 
Robert E. Merritt 
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versity of California (Boalt Halll in I 966. He is a 
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Rcall'rtlpcrty Suhcommittec ofCEB's Joint Adviso-
ry CcHllmHtce. 
yc:u·s and nver S-+.5 million in attempts to 
oht:un <15 required pcnnits. After ohtain-
lllL! only fnur desplle its effort\. Dow 
called 11 qu11;,. 
!11 fact. the real prohlem for Dow wa;, 
nut ddavs 111 geujng pennas hut its in-
:Jhli!lv to meet air standards dic-
tated largely hy tllc J lJ7() federal Clean 
.-\n Act. Pcnnu stre:unlining Wt1Uid have 
dune rwthing to remove this madhlock. 
!\;e\ en he less. when Duw made tl1e deci-
~i\ln to hlllld elsewhere, the hlmne was 
placed on a faceless hurcaucracy and to 
a lcssc·r extent on the Brown administra-
tion. Ironically. less lhanayearearliertl1e 
Rav An.:a p,lllution Control District had 
alsu hlockcd Arco Chemical Company, a 
dinsmn of Atlmltic Richfield, !rom 
building a\ I billion petrochermcaJ facil-
Ity on property adjoining lhe Dow site. In 
cnmpan"on to tl1e furor raised over tl1c 
Dow facility. Arco 's denial went virtually 
11!111 0 l icc d. 
110\\' IT WORKS-IN THEORY 
The Pennit Stre;unlining Act (not the 
Act\ Dllicial designation-lhe nmnc has 
been tacked on hy various court<> and 
commcntatnrSl was intended to establish 
ri!!Pmus time lines for state and local 
:1genucs ttl act on development pennil<>. 
On the tiling of <m application for a dc-
\'clopment prOJCCt, the agency h<L<; 30 
days to nollfy the applicall! of delicien-
cres Ill the app!Jcallon or lt will he 
deemed complete. Govt C $65943(hi. 
The agency t11en has a limned pen()(l 
wHhin whiL'h to take action on t11e appli-
cation tmce rt is complete; one year if llle 
pwJeCt requires <m cnvtronmental impact 
repon under the Califomia Environmen-
tal Quality Act tCEQA) (Pub Res C 
~ ~I 000-21177), ;md six monlhs if a 
negative declaration is required or the 
proJect is exempt from CEQA. Govt C 
~65950. Failure of lhe agency to act wilh-
in the applicable time period results in lhe 
applicatHlll being "deemed approved." 
which me<ms approved as a matter of law 
wtthout actual action being taken. Govt C 
~(1595()( b). 
The focus of this article is on applica-
tions processed tllrough local agencies, 
altlwugh tl1e b~l<>ic scheme of the Act ap-
pltes to state agencies as well. 
The Office of Pennit Assisumce 
\OP/\), a p:u'l of the Governor's Office nf 
PLumml! anJ Research, is chm·ged wilh 
the duty of assisting agencies in imple-
mentmg t11e Act and resolving conflicts 
when a development proJeCt affcl'ls more 
th:m one agency. The office is also eager 
tn assist applicants who feel that an 
agency is nut adhering to the Act. As ;m 
ann of the Govcmor's otlice, OPA can 
bring considerable pressure to hear ,m 
state agencies. Anion against recalcitrant 
local agcnncs usually takes l11e lnnn nt 
written or vcrhal reminders ot the 
agency's responsibilities under the Act. 
Unfortunately, m:my frustrated appli-
culls do not seck assistance from OPA, 
prohahly because ti1ey do not realize as-
sist:mce is available. Anol11er problem is 
that applicmHs who du seek help wmt too 
long. TI1e hencf"it of OPA's involvement 
cnmes from cajoling agencies into com-
pliance; OPA cannot punish l11c agency 
after the fact. ( Applic;mts with problems 
involving compli<mce with tile Act 
should contact David C. Nuncnk;unp or 
Christine Kinne of OPA.l 
The scope of ti1c Act is detenmncd by 
the key tenns, "development proJect," 
"development," ;md "proJect." The Act is 
triggered by the filing of an application 
for a development project. A develop-
ment proJect is defined as ;my prnJCCt un-
dertaken for the purpose of development. 
Project means ;my activity involvmg the 
issuance to a person of a lease, penntt, li-
cense, certificate ur other entitlement for 
use by one or nHJre public agencies. Gnvt 
C ~(J5931. Development is broadly de-
lined to cnwmp;L<;S virtually any activlly 
a!lccUn_;! land Pr water. It includes the 
placement or erection of any solid materi-
al or structure; grading, removing, dredg-
ing, minmg, or extraction of any matcnal: 
~.:h<mgc in the Jcn~ity ur intensity of usc 
of land; and construction, rcconstrucunn, 
demolition. or alteration of l11c sit.c of any 
structure. Gnvt C ~(15927. The detinHHm 
was clearly taken from the Califomia 
Co:L"tal Act of 1976 (Pub Res C §30m0-
30lJOO), because the two definitions of 
development arc virtually identical. 
Compare Govt C §65927 witi1 Pub Res C 
§30 106, and sec GeorJ?ta-Pactjic Corp. v 
Caliji>rnia Coastal Comm'n (19X2l 132 
CA3d 67X, 6lJ5, 1X3 CR 395, 405. Al-
though the Act specifics that its defini-
tions only shall govem construction of 
the Act, GL<;es interpreting "dcvclop-
mclll" under the Coastal Act may he per-
suasive. See, e.g., Sierra Club r .Harsh 
(SDCalllJXX)692FSupp 121f)(U.S.ac-
lJUisiuon of land for wildlife refuge not 
development l; Montcrev Sand Co. v Cali-




f' .. ~) 
CA3d l6lJ, 236 CR 315 (s;md extraction 
from sea floor is development); /)e/ucchi 
\' Cnuntv o(Santa Cruz ( 19X6) 179 C A3d 
X 14, 225 CR ..J-3 <greenhouses cunstitutc 
dcvclopmcnll; Calijimua Coastal 
Comm 'n v (Juanta lnv. Corp. ( l W\t)) 113 
C A 3d 579, 170 CR 263 (stock coopera-
tive conversion deemed development). 
There arc a number of express exclu-
sions from the Act, including pennits to 
operate tGovt C *65lJ2X), final subdivi-
sion maps tGovt C §65927), ministerial 
projccL<> tGovt C *n5lJ2X), ch;mge of or-
g:mil.ation or a renrg:mization under the 
District Rcorg:mization Act or 1965 
(Govt C ~*56000-5649X) (Govt C 
*(15927), land divisions in connection 
with U1C purch:L~e of land by public agen-
L"tes lor public recreational uses ( Govt C 
*05927), removal or harvesting of major 
vegetation oti1er th:m for agricultural pur-
p\lscs <Govt C ~(15927), kelp harvesting 
tGovt C §65927), timber operations un-
der the z· Bcrg-Nejcdly Forest Practice 
Act of Jl)73 (Govt C §(15927), certain 
applications to appropriate water under 
l11c Water Code <Govt C *65955), and ac-
tivities of the State Energy Resources De-
velopment ;md Conscrvatjon Commis-
sion (Govt C §65922). There are also 
special provisions on application of the 
Act to issuance of pcnniL-; for hazardous 
W<L'Itc facility projects. Govt C *65963.1. 
An import:mt exclusion is for '"penn its 
to operate." Vague at best, ti1is phrase h:L'i 
been construed by only one coun, which 
found llwt it encompassed a pcnnit rc-
qmred hy the State Lands Commission t\J 
conduct geophysical research in CIXL'ital 
waters. Accordingly, tile pcnnit w;L-; not 
subject to the Act. Meridwn Ocean Srs. 
v State Lands Comm 'n ( Jl)l)()) 222 CA3d 
153, 271 CR ++5. When tile pennit re-
lates to both the siting and operation of a 
facility, it is unclear whether the Act ap-
plies. TI1is is frequently the c:L-;e wil11 
conditional usc pcnnits for location of 
businesses. For example, a truck tcnninal 
may he given the right to operate in a par-
ticular location as long as truck move-
ment is confined to particular hours. A 
court would probably look carefully at 
the penniuing process :md the underlying 
zoning and general plan designation:-. I\) 
dctcnninc whether l11eir main purpose is 
to regulate development or usc. 
Ministerial actions arc not covered by 
l11e Act. Therefore, if the action is not tak-
en, the applicant must bring an ordinary 
mand:unus action under CCP *I 085 t11 
L"ornpcl the agency to issue the pcnnit. 
Hollman \' Warren (194X) 32 C2d 351. 
355, 1% P2d 562. 565; California Ass ·n 
r!( Health Facilities \' Kizer ( 1986) 17,'\ 
CA3d 1109, 1114, 224 CR 247, 249. 
Building pennits are often ministerial. 
Some jurisdictions, however, have made 
building pennits discretionary, in which 
case the Act should apply. Fontana Uni-
fied ,)'chon/ Dist. v Citv of Rialto ( 1985) 
173 CA3d 725, 219 CR 254. Attomcys 
can make ti1is detennination hy review-
ing the local building ordinance. When 
the building pennit is discretionary, usu-
ally no action under CEQA is required 
because issu:mec of the pennlt may well 
he categorically exempt. 14 Cal Cudc 
Regs §* 1530 I, 15303. TI1crcfore, the six-
mollths deemed approval provision of the 
Act will apply. (See The Deemed Ap-
proval Stage, below.) 
Sometimes questions arc raised about 
whcl11cr ti1c Act applies to public agen-
cies. TI1erc appears to he nothing preclud-
ing application when one agency is seek-
ing a penn it from another. The definition 
of "project" under the Act refers to "the 
issu;mce to a person of a lease, penn it, li-
cense, certificate, or other entitlement" 
(emphasis added) and the tcnn "person·· 
often includes public agencies. Govt C 
~65931; sec. e.g., Pub Res C §21 066 with 
respect to CEQA. Consistent with this 
view, "development" includes "ccmstnJC-
tion, recoustruction, demolition, or alter-
ation of the size of any structure, includ-
ing any facility uf any private, public, or 
mtmlcipul utility.'' (Emphasis added.! 
Govt C §65927. To see how the Act 
works, it helps to separate the Act into 
two stages---the "application stage" and 
the "deemed approval stage.'' These two 
st:tges arc explained below and summa-
rized in tJ1c chart on p 38. 
The Application Stage 
The application stage is the starting 
line for pennit applications under the 
Act. It hegins when the applicant files an 
application for a development project 
with the lead agency. The "lead agency" 
is l11e one having principal responsibility 
for approving the development project. 
Govt C §65929. It must be distinguished 
from '"responsible agencies," which have 
discretionary approval power over a proJ-
ect, but which are not lead agencies. 14 
Cal Code Regs §15381. 
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The application swge also serves an 
important function under the SubdivisiOn 
Map Act tGnvt C ~~664J0-6MYY.3h 
C'umplction ()f the application locks l!l 
the ordin;mces, policies. and ~tandmds 
that apply to the local deustn!l 
to approve or dtsappmvc the tenl<ilivc 
map. Govt C ~hM7..J..2. Likewise. m the 
case of a vesting tentative map, these nr-
dinanccs, policies. and standards general-
ly establish the nmurc of tl1c vested 
to develop the property. Govl C 
~6649R.l. 
To inform the applicant of the 
agency's application requirements, tl1e 
Act requires each state and local agency 
to develop ;md keep current a list of infor-
mation required in submitting ;m applica-
tion. Govt C ~§65Y40. 65942. The infor-
mation must include the criteria the 
agency will apply in deterrmning the 
completeness uf the application. Govt C 
§65941. 
On suhmtssion of an applicatmn. tllc 
lead agency h~L~ 30 calendar days to de-
terrnine if the application is complete. To 
trigger the 30-day requirement, the appli-
cant must state in the application that It is 
an application for a development pennn. 
Govt C §65()43. In addition, the applicant 
must submit a ~igncd statement indicat-
ing whether the proJeCt is located on ;my 
listed hazardous w<L'>te sites. Lists of 
these sites arc distributed to each city and 
county by the Secret:1ry of Environmen-
tal Affairs. Govt C ~65Y62.5. If the 
agency fails to make a written determina-
tion within 30 days, the application is 
Llccmed complete. Agcncic;.. arc held 
strictly to the 30-Jay period. See Orst \' 
Citv Counnl ( IYY()) 21 Y CA3d 1576, 2M\ 
CR 912 (court refused to allow a city to 
reject an application 41 days after ). 
A complete application. whether deter-
mined by the agency to he complete or 
deemed complete by p<L'>sage of time, 
starts the clock running for action on the 
application-the deemed approval stage. 
If the application is found incomplete, 
the agency's response to the applicant 
must include a list and description of the 
specific information needed to make the 
application complete. TI1e applicant may 
then resubmit the application along with 
the required materials listed by the 
agency. The rcsuhmiWtl hegins ;mother 
30-day period for the agency to deter-
mine completeness. ;md, if the agency 




nation, the application will be dcemco 
complete. If the agency again detennincs 
that the application is not complete, the 
must he provided a means ttl 
Local may provide ft)f 
appeals to the planning commission. the 
body, or both. Agenctes ha\'-
ing no goveming b\)lly may dcs1gnate the 
tlircnor to hear appeals. The appeal mu~t 
he decided withm 60 calcnilitr days after 
the application i~ recci ved: if il is not. the 
application shall he deemed complete. 
TI1e applicam ;md !11e agency can mutual-
ly agree to extend ;my of the time lirml\ 
under the application submission stage. 
Govt C §65943. 
The resubminal provision of the Act 
applies only when the agency reJects the 
applicalion in a timely manner. In Ors1 v 
Citv Council, supra, after the 30-day pe-
nod had run ;md tlle application had been 
deemed complete by operation of law. the 
applic;uH resubmitted the application at 
the city's request The court found that by 
cnopcrating with the city in making the 
rcsuhmiWll, the applicant did not waive 
the benefit<; already obtained under the 
Act 
The Deemed Approval Stage 
Once the application is complete and 
;t-;suming the project is not exempt from 
CEQA, the lead agency must conduct ;m 
initial study under CEQA to determine 
whether an EIR is required or whether a 
negative decl;tration will suffice. 14 Cal 
Code Regs § 15063. The lead agency is 
directed to make this deterrnination with· 
in 30 days, although tl1is time can he ex-
tended 15 will! consent of the 
applic;mt and U1e agency. Pub Res C 
I OX0.2. ll' the lead agency reqmrcs 
preparation of an then it must ap-
prove or disapprove the project withm 
one year from IJJe date the application 
W<L~ complete or deemed complete. Govt 
C §65950. If l11e project is exempt from 
CEQA or the agency determines that a 
negative declaration can be adopted, the 
agency's period to act is limited to six 
months. Govt C §65950. The applicable 
time c~m he extended for up to 90 days by 
agreement of the applicant <md the 
agency. Govt C §65957. 
There <trc some exceptions to these 
time limits. For insumce, when <m exten-
sion of time is given to complete and cer-
tify the EIR, the agency must act wtthm 
90 days after certification of the ErR. 
Govt C §65lJ50. I. If an EIR is combined 
with an environmental impact statement 
under the Nariona.l Environmental Policy 
Act (42 USC 1-43-Pl, the agency 
can waive the time limits under the Act, 
hut must act wilhin60 after the com-
hined statemem is 
§65951. 
Govt C 
Rcsponsihle agencies must act w1thin 
l i\0 days after the lead agency approval 
nf the project or l ISO days after accep-
tailce of a completed application by the 
responsible agency, whichever is later. 
Govt C §65Y52. If the lead agency disap-
proves the application, the application 
before the responsible agency is deemed 
to be withdrawn. Govt C §65952(h). 
The Subdivision Map Act imposes 
certain IHne limits on subdivision ap-
provals. Govt C §§66452.1, 66452.2, 
66463. Failure of the agency to meet 
these limil'; also resulls in deemed ap-
provaL Gmt C §66452.4. The Act pro-
vides that these time limil<> shall continue 
to apply and are not extended by the time 
limits specltled in the Act. Govt C 
§65952.1. Although this provision may 
shorten the time for acting on subdivision 
maps, it has little practical impact be-
cause the approval of the maps must still 
comply witlJ due process ;md the deemed 
approval does not avoid the need w make 
lindings as required under the Subdivi-
sion Map Act. Horn v County Ventura 
(I Y79) 24 C'3d 605, 156 CR 718; Wi:)()(i-
Land Hills Residents Ass'n v Citv Council 
(1975) 44 CA3d X25, 118 CR X56. 
The penalty for the lead or responsible 
agency's f~lllure to act within the time al-
lowed is "deemed approval" of the proj-
ect Govt C §65956(h). This automatic 
approval lies at the heart of the Act. How-
ever, when t11e law requires public notice 
;md opportunity for a hearing, the process 
perfecting deemed approval has become 
quite involved. The process and its defi-
ciencies arc discussed in The Third Blow: 
Denial of Due Process, below. 
This simplistic explanation of the Act 
conceals a tortured past. In the brief 13 
years since enactment, numerous appel-
late court decisions have interpreted the 
Act. Only two cases (Palmer v Citv of 
Ojai ( 1986) 178 CA3d 280, 223 CR 542, 
;md Orsi v Citv Council, supra, discussed 
helow) havC' upheld automatic approval. 
For the most part, the judiciary has been 
hostile to the Act, severely limiting its 
application. \Vc tum now to some of these 
judicial stnkes ;md <L<>sess tlle d;unage. 
THE FIRST BLOW: Lcgi~lativt• Acts .\rc 
\Jot Suhjcd 11, the Ad 
No one would have guessed from the 
puhlicity attending the Act's passa_!!c that 
it was intended to apply to something less 
than the en me hundlc ol cntttlcmcnts re-
quired lnr a dcvclopmclll proJeCt. In tact. 
gtven the brcadtlJof the dctlnition nl"de-
velopmcnt" and the fact that it includes a 
"change in the density or intensity of usc 
or land." one would have expected lew 
limitauons on tile scope of the Act. Nev-
ertheless, the lirs t appc II ate case to con-
strue the Act held tJJat it did not apply to 
legtslative acttons-- in this case <m <tppli-
cation to rezone I X acres in l'v1untcrcy 
County to mmply with the general plan. 
The court hdd that unly adJudicawrv ac-
tmns arc "proJccL<>" under the Act. Lundi 
v Cuunlv o(Monterev t Jl)i\3) 139 CA3d 
934, I Xll CR 55. 
It is unclear what in!lucnccd the cuurl 
in Lundi. The court focused on the term 
"project," ;,t;ltmg that zoning and similm 
legislative acL'> arc not projects under the 
Act. But that tcnn is not limited to pcr-
mns-11 includes any "tJthcr entitlement 
lor usc." Govt C ~65931. The view that 
the Act applies onlv to adjudicatory acts 
was held by mcmhcrs of tl1c staff within 
the Office pf Planmng and Research, who 
were hcanly tmnlved in drafting tJ1c lcg-
i"lation crc:tllng the Act. An article hy 
tHlc of the stall exprcssmg th1s interpreta-
tion may tlave nad an effect. Sec Wright. 
An 884: Srreumlining 1/ze Permil Pro-
( es.1, Office ot Planning ami Research 
(urea llJ77- 7i0. Probably the court '>ltn-
piy could not accept that the Legislature 
intended maJor i<Uld usc planning within 
a wnununity to occur hy default. The le-
gislative-adjudicatory distinction was a 
convenient line hctween policy dccisinns 
alfccung tile community at large (such as 
general plan ;uncndments) and tiwsc en-
titlements ti1at were project oriented 
(;,uch as suhdivision maps). Of course, 
because must major adjudicatory land usc 
decisions must he consistent wit11 the 
community's general plan. by excluding 
legislative changes from the ;unhit of t11e 
Act. the court put the Act on a collision 
course w1ti1 tl1c consistency doctrme if 
the undcrl\mg legislative foundation 
( p;micularly :uncndment of the general 
pl;m) has nut hccn laid. The collision llC-
curred seven years later in Lmui n·(Jste 
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Munar.;nncnl l' liuurd , 'I 
t 199()) 222 CAJd 9'i0. 27! CR 90lJ, (lis-
cussed below. For a di.\cu:-,s1on of general 
plan consistency requ1remcnL'-', "ec Curry. 
Merritt & Rivera. Gmerul Plans: Com-
ing of Age in Calijinnlil. 14 CEB Real 
Prnp L Rep 141 t Ma:v 199 ll. In any 
event, the rule ti1at t11c Act doc;, not apply 
to legislative actions is now dearly estah-
lisltcd. Moreover. tJ1c Legislature appar-
ently acquiesced wllh the decision in 
Lundi. The Act w:L' amended in jLJi\7 to 
provide that tllC failure ur the agency to 
act resulted in approval uf t11e "pcnnit 
application," where turmerly the statute 
referred to appmval nf the "project.·· 
Stats 19X7, ch 9X5 ~5. This was v1cwcd 
by a later cuurt a;, \ ahdating the Lunrli 
decision. Sec Land \\lnle ,Hwwgement v 
llourd uJ SuperTt.\or.l t llJl)()) 222 CA3d 
'J50. %() n4. 271 CR l)()lJ. 'I 15 n.f; !vf eridi-
1111 ( Jcewt Svs. v Stutt' Lmds Comm 'n 
( IYlJ()) :222 CA3d 153, .271 CR 445. 
The lcgislativc-atljudicalOry distinc-
tion is simple in cnncept. An action is leg-
islative if it prcscrihcs a new policy nr 
plan; it is adminisu·auv.: ur adjudicatory 
if it merely pursues a plan already 
adopted hy ti1c legislative body. McKnitt 
\' Citv of,'-;ucrumenl,, t ll!21) 55 CA 117, 
203 P 132; 5 McQuillin on Municipal 
Corporations~ 16:55 (3d ed Jl)X9). Adop-
tion of general plan amendments, specific 
plans, development agreements, :md znn-
mg mc:L~urcs arc usually legislative. In 
contrast, approval ol tentative ;,uhdivi-
sion maps, \ari:Uiccs, and cunditiona1 usc 
pcnnits arc seen :L'> adjudicatory. Ame/ 
l>cv. Co. v Citv of Cos111 ivfesa ( 19XO) 2X 
C3d 511, loll CR IJ04; .)'impson v Hite 
( 1950) 36 C2d 125, 222 P2d 225. Some-
times tlJC distinction becomes hlurrcd. 
however. In Vv'heelri;;ht \' Counrv oflv!u-
rin (!ll70) 2 C3d 44X, X5 CR X09, for ex-
ample, t11c court held that ;m ordmance 
govcming construction of an access road 
accurding to a prenously established 
planned community was legislative in na-
ture. The court rejected tile argument ti1at 
the purpose of tlle ordin:UJce was only to 
give effect to t11e previously declared leg-
islative intent. More recently, in South-
wesl Diva.I·Ijled, Inc. v Citv ol Brisbane 
( llJ9 ll 229 CA3d 154X, 2i\O CR X6ll, the 
court held as administrative a rezoning 
that rccontigured the boundaries of open 
space and planned development districL~ 
to confonn to revised development plans. 
ll1c court found that the action was one 
of a series to implement the development 
plans and as such was administrative in 
nall!re. See also IV IV !Jean & Assoc. v 
Citv of S. .\'an Francisco ( Jl)87) 190 
C A 3d 136X. 236 CR II (amendment to 
lc!!l~lau vel y enacted habitlt conservation 
plan was admimstrauve in nature). 
Just he cause somethmg is ca.lletl a 
.. penni(' d,)cs nut mean it is adjudicawry. 
In Mendiun Ucecm Svs. v State Lands 
Comm ·n. supra, an application for a per-
mit to cnnduct geophysical surveys using 
undcnvater air guns was held to he legis-
lative rather th~m adjudicatory. The court 
round that the "primary tllrusC of delib-
erations by the State Lands Usc Commis-
sion concerning the permit involved a 
policy decision about continuing to issue 
:-,uch pcmuL" without first requiring an 
EIR. These cases illustrate that in the in-
nc:L->ingly complex world of land usc 
pcnnitting. ~orne approvals will require 
close analysis before 1t can be detcnnined 
whether the Act applies. 
Other cxmnplcs of close calls he tween 
adJudicawry <md legislative decisions are 
not hard to Imagine. For example, consid-
er :uncndmcnt of a development agree-
ment entered into hetween a developer 
<md a city pursuant to Govt C §65864-
65 869.5. The statute provides that enact-
mcnt ol an ordinance approving a devel-
opment agreement is a legislative act, 
subject to referendum, Govt C *65X67.5. 
Also, the "tatute provides that :uncnd-
menL'i must be adopted under the s:une 
procedure. Govt C §65868. Yet manv 
thoughtfully draJtcd development agrcc-
mcnL-; provide that minor amendmenL<; 
that do IhJl alter the required provisions 
of tlle agreement can be approved admin-
istratively at the city staff level. Assum-
ing the validity of this abbreviated (and 
<L'> yet untcswd) mncndment procedure, 
would a minor amendment be viewed as 
legislative or adjudicatory? If adjudicato-
ry, at what point does tlle substance of the 
amendment convert tlle process from ad-
judtcatory to legislative? Would the result 
change if the city processed the same mi-
nor amendment witll ilie formalities ac-
corded in adoption of t11e agreement? 
THE SECOND BLOW: Approvals Must 
Await Legislative Action 
When an applicant seeks land use ap-
provals that involve a combination ot leg-
islative :md adjudicatory actions, what 
happens if tlle legislative actions have not 
occurred by ilie time the deadline for per-
mit approval has arrived? This issue was 
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confronted in Lund W!JS/t' Afanagnnem \' 
lioard ofSupervtsors, supm. in which the 
applicant sought, hut !lad not recciVt:d, 
amendment of the general a solid 
waste management plan. and to 
penn it a san nary Iandi! II Because 
one memhcr of the Buard of Supervisors 
abstained, the Board was deadlocked nn 
enacunell! of these measures. TI1e coun 
held that the county was powerless ttl 
take accompanying adjudicatory ac-
tions----.:;mcellation of a Williamsnn Act 
contract and issuance of a land usc per-
mit-hccause they were mconsistem 
with the existing county general plan ;mel 
other legislatively enacted measures. En-
actmem of the pending legislative mea-
sures was a prerequisite. This holding is 
a logical extension of Landi ;md c:t-;es 
holding that issu;mce of penn its IIKOll~ls­
tent with the general phm or zoning arc 
ultra vires. See Lesher Communications. 
Inc. v Citv of Walnut Creek (I Y9()) 52 C3J 
53 J, 277 CR I; Citv & Countv San 
Francisco v Board of Permit Appeals 
(l Y8Y) 207 CA3J IOYY. 255 CR 307. 
A similar situation arises 1f the dead-
lines under the Act run hcforc CEQA 
processing for the project is complete. 
The time limits under the Act arc tied to 
the detcnnination of whether the project 
requires ;m EIR or a negative declaration. 
The lead agency h;t<; 30 days to make the 
detennination. although this period c:m 
be extended. Puh Res C 921080.2. 
ll1c law pmv1dcs no penalty fix fall-
ure of the agency to make a detennination 
as to whether to prepare an EIR or nega-
tive declaration within the 30-day 
(as it may he extended). Likewise, once 
this detennination is made, there is no 
penalty for the agency failing to adopt a 
negative declaration within 105 or 
certify an EIR within one year. See 14 Cal 
CodeRegs*§l5107, 15108. The absence 
of a penalty has been construed as mean-
ing that the time constraint is direcwry, 
rather than mandatory. Sec Meridian 
Ocean Sys. v State Lands Comm 'n, supra. 
lf directory, the applic~mt must wait for 
the agency to act or bring a m;mdamus ac-
tion under CCP § 1085 to force the agency 
to decide ;md then prepare the negative 
declaration or <U1 EIR. 
In Land Wilste Management v Board 
of .S'upervisors, supra, the court rejected 
the idea. that the EIR for the project was 
automatically certified hy the expiration 
of the one-year time period. Implie<L but 
unstated, was reJection of the concept of 
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a deemed approval without 
Wllh CEQA. 
Unfortunately, Land H!ute 
menr docs not address the question nl 
how the tJmc periods for action on 
catnry pcnnits ;u·e affected when the 
:t);!ency delays adopting necessary 
lative enacuncnts or fails to tlJe 
CEQA process. It should have no effect 
nn the application stage. There is nothing 
in the Act or Lwui WcJSte Managemem to 
suggest that app!icmlts must wait tor all 
legtslative approvals hcfore 
applications for tentative subdivision 
maps, conditional use pennlls, or other 
adJudicatory approvals. In fac" the Act 
states that an agency must respond to the 
application within 30 days after it is re-
ceived. The usc of the word "received·· 
''The i!llricate 
interplay ol udjudicatorv 
and !l!gislutive actions in 
land use entit!enzl:'nts was 
110t envisioned hv the 
LegL'l'lature, and I a I 
to!!ing approach would 
breathe some /if{> hack 
into the Act. " 
rather th;m "filed" or words of similar im-
port suggests the agency may not he able 
to refuse a proffered application. Govt C 
~65943. In m;my this is not 
a concern because local allow or 
even encourage a combined filing of all 
land use applications to C(XJruinate pro-
cessmg. However, it may he a m 
some jurisdictions the agency de-
stres w condition submission of an appli-
cation on completion of necessary legis-
lative acts. One case-not involving the 
Act but decided after its enactment-held 
that a city by ordinance could lawful! y re-
fuse to accept the filing of ;my application 
for subdivision of property until zoning 
for the property has been completed. 
Bennv v City of Alameda ( 1980) I 05 
CA3d 1006, 164 CR 776. 
The problems arise in the deemed ap-
proval stage. A major concern is whether 
the time for the agency to act hegins to 
run before the enactments 
have occurred. One view is that the time 
period docs not commence while legisla-
uvc acuon is pending. hut this seems un-
duly harsh. There is no reason for the 
tn he penalized by having to 
wall ;m addiuonal six months or one year 
from the time the legislative action oc-
Anothcr view i~ to treat the pennits 
to the 
enactments. 
counter to the 
in Land ~vasre v 
Uoard of Supervisors, supra, that agen-
cies arc powerless to issue land use per-
mits that arc inconsistent with 
legislation. Also, this solution would 
deny due process to l<md-
owncrs-a problem which is discussed 
later. 
A better approach IS to toll the time pe-
riod under the Act until the agency adopt<> 
t11c necessary legislative approvals. In 
nther wnrds, if the required legislative ac-
tion is not taken by the time the six-
month or one-year time period has run on 
the permit applications, the time is ex-
tended until the legislative action occurs. 
Tims, at the time of the legislative action. 
the agency will also he required to act on 
the pennits. This approach allows the 
agency to attach conditions to the pennirs 
or even deny them at that time. If it fails 
tn act, the permits are deemed approved, 
hut only to the extent they arc consistent 
with the legislative enactments. While 
this may be fairest to applicants, by no 
means does it assure action on the penn it. 
The root of the problem is that the agency 
is not required to act on legislative mat-
ters. Without a mandate requiring the 
agency to act, the applic;mt c;mnot appeal 
to tllc courts through mandamus to re-
quire the agency to act. Eventually the 
applicant may be able to perfect ;m action 
for inverse condemnation, hut this rarely 
is a practical strategy. It requires tbe 
applicant to jump through numerous pro-
cedural ;md even then it may not be 
to show that existing zoning <md 
general plan designations deny the appli-
cam economically viable use of its l;md. 
Sec Agins v City of Tiburon 0 980) 447 
US 255. The sad fact is that if the agency 
wants to drag its feet, there is little the 
applie<mt can do. The problem is most 
acute at the local agency level when 
islative actions are routinely required in 
conjunction with the permitting process. 
At the state level, there is frequently no 
need for legislative action so that the 
agency can be brought into court if it 
chooses to ignore the Act 
A related questJnn anses if the deemed 
approval occur~ heforc c:EQA processing 
is cnmplctc. A"sume the agency has de-
tcnnmed an EIR is rl~quired. hut the unc 
year for action on the permit applic:uton 
arrives before the EIR i' ready fur ccntti 
catmn. Let\ look at the possibilities. Fol-
hlwing the logiC ot Land \}{l.\le Afww~:;e­
ment. a court might find that the agcnn 
is without authority to approve the pcrmtl 
application until the CEQA process is 
completed. This would give the agency 
time to build illlo any approvaltmti}!ation 
measures required by t11e EIR or negative 
declaration. Or. the agency could deny 
the pcnmt if warranted by adverse im-
pacts. As su~ge~ted wJth respect to pend-
ing legislative measures. time under tlte 
Act could he tolled until the CEQA prn-
cess \V:L\ wmplctc. Another possibihty 
would he lor the court Ill find a deemed 
approval (:Lssuming due process issues 
were adequately addressed) reasoning 
that lailurc of the Legislature to condition 
approval under the Act on compliance 
witll CEQA cv1dcnccs ;m intent to sutx,r-
dinate CEQA tn l11c Act. If this were the 
outcome, the courts should pennit mem-
bers of the public tn challenge the ap-
proval tor failure to comply with CEQA 
if an action allcgmg this deficiency was 
hrought \Vllhmtlle I XO-day st:ltutc llf lim-
iwllons applicable when no ElR or nega-
tive declaration has hccn prepared. Puh 
Res C ~21167(a). Since the approval re-
sulted i11 the ah~cllCC <1! ,1 dcci>.inn. the 
statute of lirmtations wnuld run from tJ1e 
date of cnmmenccment of construcuon. 
or if not obvious, tlle date l11e public knew 
or -,hould have known of t11c devclnp-
ment project. Concerned Citizens of Cos-
ta Mesa, Inc. \' 32nd [)ist. Agriculwral 
Ass 'n < 19,'\6 1 42 C3d 92Y, 231 CR 7-tX. 
The facts presented in our hypotheti-
cal arose recently in the context of ;m 
applicathm for construction of a mml-
mall in the Venice area of Los Angelc-.. 
The city zoning administrator mitially 
took l11e posllion that tJ1c permit was 
deemed approved even though there had 
hcen no complmnce With CEQA. hut the 
Board of Zomng Appeals reversed after 
l11e Auomcy General interceded <md ar-
gued that Land ~~(lSte Managemclll re-
quired a denial. The applicant l11en filed 
suit, ;md as part of a settlement the city 
council agreed to find the permit deemed 
approved. This incident h;L~ prompted in-
troduction n! lcgislatiun amending the 
Act ( AB 2223 ). now pending, providing 
tlwt a pctmn will only he <kx~med ap-
proved if the agency ha.\ compiled wil11 
CEQA. (An interim hearin!.' on the bill 
will he held 111 Sacr;uncntn on DcL·emhcr 
17, jt)') I. Sec lfpcomin~:; Fl'ents. p 73.) 
:\llhough the Act prm ides express 
time pcnods and a limited 90-day cxtcn-
'ion for deemed approval. 1t is unclear 
whether a court 1s JUSllfted in gralting a 
hllling C\ mcept ontl) the Act. The intncate 
interplay of adjudicatory ;md legislative 
actmns in land usc entitlements Wtl\ BOt 
cnv1sinncd by the Legislature, ;md the 
lulling approach would breal11c some life 
hack into the Act. While it would require 
~mnc judicial enginecnng, the result 
would be mure consistent with l11c legis-
lative purposes ;md less drastic than rul-
ing that tl1e time penodc, do not hegin run-
ning on penn it approvals untlllegislativc 
actions arc complete. 
THE THIRD BLOW: l>l'nial Of l>nl' 
l'rot·css 
One of the I irsl qucsuons rmscd under 
the Act was t11c nmstitutiOnality of 
deemed approval in cases where permits 
would otherwise require public notice 
and opportunity for a hearing. The basis 
lor conccm was Hom v Countv of Venlll-
ra ( 1979) 24 C3d W5. 156 CR 718, 
which held that public notice ;md oppor-
tunity for a hearing is required by due 
process when approval of a parcel map 
substantially affects the property rights of 
tllhcr landowners. See also Kennedv ,. 
Citv o( Hav-H urd ( 1980) 105 CA3d 953. 
165 CR 132. In Palmer v Citv ol Ojai 
( 1986) 178 CA3d 280, 223 CR 542, the 
Second District Court of Appeal dis-
mis~cd tl1e constitutional issue with rela-
tive case. Thb did twt go unnoticed (sec 
9 CEB Real Prop L Rep 112 (July I Y86)), 
;md three years later t11e Fourth District 
Court of Appeal held the deemed approv-
al section of the Act unconstitutional in-
solar <L<; it led to approval of applications 
without provision for notice and opportu-
mty for a he:uing to affected landowners. 
Selinger v Citv Council ( 1 YS9) 216 CA3d 
259, 264 CR 4YY. However. before the 
decision in Selinger cmne down, the Leg-
islature. apparently une:L'>Y with the hold-
ing in Palmer. mnendcd Govt C ~65956 
to address the due process concem. St<1t'> 
1987. ch Y85. 
As l11e Act now reads, l11e applicant is 
given two alternatives to ohtain a deemed 
approval in cases where the law requires 
puhlic notice and hearing. The first (add-
c:J m I 982) requires tl1c filing of an action 
under CCP ~ IOX5 (traditional m:mda-
nws) rcque~ting the supenor court to or-
der the agencv to give notice. to hold the 
hc;mng. or hnt1l. The action must be filed 
:~t lc:L\t (l0 days before exp1ration of the 
! nne limit resulting in deemed approvaL 
The Act gives tl1e court no guidance on 
tluw to proceed except to state that the 
matter shall have preference over other 
uvil actions and proceedings. Govt C 
~(15956( al. The court should be able to 
consider any issues that may he raised in 
defense of application of the Act. such a.·;; 
the agency's failure to have enacted nec-
c~sary legislative approvals that arc a pre-
requisite to issu:mce of the permits. 
The nl11er choice (added by the due 
process mnendment in 1987) is for the 
:tppl!r:mt to resort to a form of self-help 
hv pmv1ding l11c public notice that the 
law requires. The applicant must the 
agency at least seven days' advance no-
tice of imentitm to provide tlle public no-
ucc. Huwcvcr. the notice cannot be 
earlier than 60 days after expiration of the 
tunc at which deemed approval occurred. 
TI1e reason for this requirement is not 
clear. Probably it was meant to allow the 
agency suflicient time to act on its own, 
even after the deemed approval period 
had rur1. The agency must provide the 
applicant with the requirements for distri-
bution of the public notice. Govt C 
~65941.5. The contents of l11e nouce shall 
include a description and the location of 
the proposed development, the permit 
application number, the name and ad-
dress of the permitting agency, and a 
~tatement that the project shall be deemed 
approved if the permitting agency has not 
acted within 60 days. The 60-day period 
begins running from the date the notice is 
g1ven. Govt C §65956. 
Even t110ugh the Act was amended to 
meet the due process requirement<; in 
Horn v Count\' o{Ventura, supra, tbe lan-
guage does not actually require a public 
hearing or ensure the opportunity for one. 
A notice given unilaterally hy the appli~ 
cant witlJOut more can hardly be said to 
provide opportunity for a hearing. The 
assumption seems to be that. once notice 
is given. the agency will wake up or be 
forced by its constituency to hold a hear-
ing. lf it is inclined to do so, some addi-
tional notice will be required hecause the 
applicant"-; notice will not set a time and 
place for the hearing (unless tbis has been 
worked out with the agency, which is un-
35 
likely hecause then the agency would 
have noticed the heanng it<>ell). The st;n-
tHe states that; if l11c agency tails tn 
spoml after the dcvdopa mitiates the IIP-
tice, the deemed approval will nccuc 
The self-help remedy docs not 
the due process dilemma. Under lfom 1 
Cuwuv Ventura. supra. due proces.> fl'-
quircs opponumty for a hearing as \Ve II 
as notice. Without a heing sched-
uled. there is no opportunity for adjominl! 
l;mdowners to ohject to a proJect. Thus. 
an applicant may he forced to petition the 
court to order a hearing. Regrettably. the 
Act falls shtlrt 111 IHll authorizing such an 
action after the applic:mt has pmndcd 
puhlic notice. Nevertheless, \HJe is m-
clincd to hclieve that a court would impiy 
amhority to order a puhlic hcanng at tile 
applicant's request if the giving of nouce 
did not prompt the agency to do so on Hs 
own. 
The hearing need not occur at any par-
ticular time to sattsfy due process. A re-
cent case indicates that due process wtl! 
be satisfied if project opponents arc 
the opportunity to he heard hy a review-
ing hody conductmg a de novo hearing on 
an appeal of the deemed approval. Ci,mi 
v San Diego Tmsr & Sal'. nank tScpL I' 
1991,4 Civ DOI5057) 91 Daily Joumal 
DAR 11309,91 RccordcrCDOS 74lX. In 
Orsi v Citv Council. supra, seven puhl1c 
hearings were held on the applicant's 
phmned unit development <PUDl 
withPU! action bein!.' t;tkcn wtl.hin the 
applicahlc time pcrwd. Stating in a font-
note that tile retJUirements of notice and 
hearing were not at Issue, the court found 
that the pcnmt was deemed approved. 
However, to satisfy due process, the no-
lice and puhlic hearing would have tore-
late to tile issuance of t11c pennir; it would 
not he suflicicnt if the was lim-
ited to some collateraJ aspect of per-
mining process, ~uch as ccruficatjon of 
the EIR. 
LINGERIN<; CONCERNS 
Absence of Findin~JS 
If notice and an opportunity for bear-
ing arc given to adjmning landowners, 
docs due process also require findings 
based on suhstamial evidence to support 
t11e approval'' The answer turns on 
whether, witiwut findmgs, a court can ad-
equately fC\ iew t11e approval. Nothin2 in 
the Act is intended to preclude appeals ot 
deemed approvals and the statutory ap-
prcntdcd for pcnnns 
li![)(lflga ;\ss 'n a 
Scenic Communi tv v of Los An-
(! lJ74) II C3d 506, 1!3 CR 1\36. 
The ahscncc elf was not an 
issue m Ors1. nur W<l'> it raised in Palmer 
r Cirr supra, the only otllcr case 
upholding automatic approval under the 
Act. However. it was the hao,is tor de-
deemed or a temativc 
suhdivisiun map under a pmvtsloll in tl1c 
Suhd!vtsi1Hl \1ap Act (Gnvt C ~~664l<J.-
664lJ9.37). In Woodland Hills Residents 
Counul (I 44 CA3d 
a neighborhood associ-
ation a tentative subdivision 
map un the ground that it was inconsis-
!Cnt with a enacted mnendment 
The map wa~ 
agency. On ap-
cnmmission ;md city 
hoth bodies were unable ttJ ren-
der a decision hccause tic votes. Under 
the Subdivision Map Act and local ordi-
mmcc tile effect of a !lc vote 1s to the 
were 
that 
and af!lnn the 
of the map. 
at from t11e supreme court 
decision in li!panga 'n j{!r a Scenic 
Communitv su-
pra. the court held that linJings were 
semial to enable the to determine 
on what basis to seek and to ap-
prise the coun of the basis for 
t11e acuon. 
The issue of findmgs as it relates to the 
Act hw.; not gone completely unnoticed. 
Il wm; hrietly discussed in Selinger. 
where court declined to follow Wood-
land Hills, that the insoluble con-
llict between the requirement\ 
uf various statutes (such m; the Subdivi-
Act) ;UJd the Act must he re-
snhed in favor of ti1e latter. But Selinger 
he considered as having dis-
did not focus on 
Land 
emphasized 
m tlJe land use 
process and held that projecL<; lacking 
such consistency cannot be deemed ap-
proved. Findings are critical to the con-
sistency detennination. In the 
court h<L<;cd its decision on CCP :S 1094.5. 
However, the that t,f)e 
requirement nf 
tionally grounded as well. 111c supreme 
cnurt nuted that its ari~es from 
"jud,t>e-made law" and finLl~ support in 
consideration." To-
a Scenic ' 
Cuwuv Los (1974) 11 C3d 
506, 515, !13 CR S36, 841. Faced with 
the question, it would not be 
for a Cllurt to rule that due process re-
quires findings to support the approval 
of landowners arc 
affected. The right 
is no important th<m notice and 
opponumty for a 
court's on 
challenge to the should not he 
the lack of findings. 
DeNned Approval of What? 
In where the rights of 
mvners arc affected, there appears to be 
little left of deemed approvaL The appli-
cant is hcst advised to go to court <md ob-
uun an cmler the agency to act 
But when notice and hearing are not re-
due process, deemed approval 
may still work, In these cases it is inter-
to ask the question: Exactly what 
is approvcJ when the time period has 
nm' LL'iCs holding that permits have 
hcen deemed approved are not helpful. 
Ojai, supra, the 
court rcvcr:-;ed denying a peti-
tion for a wnt of mandate compelling ap-
proval of a subdivision map, conditional 
use pcrmiL :md building permit The only 
issue heforc the court was the constitu-
tionality of the deemed approval provi-
sion of the Act. On remand, the trial court 
determined based on the facts 
was not cnutled to a 
"deemed approval" status under the Act 
In Ursi \' Citv Council. supra. the cnurt 
found the PUD pennit that petitioners 
had applied fur was approved under the 
:\ct. Nothing was stated abom the detail:-. 
uf the approval. 
Deemed approval has many ramifica-
tions. Take the case of a subdivision map. 
Is the map approved without conditions 
or arc conditions implied ~o that it meets 
requirements of the agency's subdivision 
nrdin<u1Ce ., If the ordinance require" 
:-.treets to be improved to a certain st<m-
dard. c;m the agency still requtre the sub-
divider to enter into a suhdiviston agree-
ment and post bonds or other forms ot 
security as provided in the Map Act? See 
Govt C ~~66499-66499.10. Some com-
mentators have suggested that agencies 
would do well to draft st<mdard cunditions 
applicable to deemed approvab. Wrighr. 
AB 884: Streamlining the Pemw Process. 
Office of Planning and Research (circa 
1977-71\); Wilson, [)own Stream from 
Streamlinmt:. 7CalLawb7!Aug.l91\/). 
.\ud vvhat about the need to address spe-
cific conditions that may relate only tn the 
particular development project. such as 
mitigation me<L~urcs recommended in m1 
EIR nr mitigated negative deciMation! 
Do they automatically become condi-
tion'>'~ Can an ordinance reqmre that 
deemed approvals incorporate recom· 
mcndations of staff for dedicatitl!IS, exac-
tions, :md otllcr cnnditions that arc made 
in reviewing the applicauou 1 Could a city 
even enact a ·pmson pdl" ordmancc that 
would impose conditions on deemed ap-
f:tr more nnert1us tll:m would nor-
mally apply 1 We can only ~peculate on 
answers to t11ese questions because nei-
ther the courts nor t11c Leg1slature has 
seen lit to grapple with the question of 
\vhat "deemed approval" really me;ms. 
General Reading 
Wilson, Down Stream From Stream-
lining, 7 Cal Law 66 (Aug. 1987) 
Sahm, Project Approval Under the 
California Environmental Quality Act: It 
Always Takes Longer Than You Think, 19 
Santa Clara L Rev 579 (1979) 
Industry/Government Publications; 
Studies; Reports; Position Papers 
Curtin & Byrd, DevelopmentMorato· 
WHAT ARE THE ANSWERS'! 
The Act may be dying, hut n 1s not 
dead. Changes e<m be made legislatively 
tn restore its vitality. Some suggestions 
!Ill! ow. 
• Provide for the Art to apply to legisla-
tive decisions that ;trc site specific, i.e. 
those that affect only the property fur 
which ;m accomp;mying adJudicatorv 
penmt is sought (t'.g., zoning). Re-
quire agencies to concurrently process 
hoth legislative ;md adjudicatory en-
titlements that are site spccilic unless 
infeasible. General pl;m mnendrnent-; 
would be excepted from tl1ese provi-
sions. 
• Build in a tolling cuuccpt so tlmt when 
delays occur in CEQA processmg or 
cnacunelll nl neces:-.ary legislative 
prereqUisites. the agency must act on 
the penn it snon ( wtthin 30 days) after 
such actions occur. 
• ScuHie the idea nf deemed approval 
when notice and opportunity tor he<tr· 
ing arc requtred hy law. Provide for a 
summ:try court procedure allowing 
l11e applicant to quickly obtain an or-
der requiring the agency to gi vc notice 
and hold such a hc;tring (or be held in 
cnntempO. ln l;u·ge counties, such 
matters could he referred to referees. 
Limit the defenses that can he raised 
to whether the appllcahle time period 
has run for the agency to act. Make tl1e 
nrdcr nonappealable. ;.,o that it em 
only he rcview~:d ~:xtraordinary 
writ Allow the prevailing p:trty tore-
cover reasonable attorney fees. A less 
dcstrahle alternauve would he to pm-
vide for de novo hearings by review-
ing court" on appeal of deemed ap-
provals when nu hearings were 
conducted hy the permming agency. 
rium Does Not Toll The Permit Stream-
lining Acts' Time Limitations, Public 
Law News (Winter 1990). 
Wright, AB 884: Streamlining The 
Permit Process, Office of Planning and 
Research (Circa 1977-78). 
Other 
Curtin & Wood, "Ambit of Permit 
Streamlining Act Is Shrinking," Los An-
geles Daily Journal (Oct 5, 1990). 
• !n CL\es not reqlllring notice :md op-
portunity tor a heanng, define what 
"deemed approval" me;ms. Provide 
for each agency to adopt standard con-
dnions that shall apply in t11e case of 
deemed approvah. provided those 
cPwhtinns can be justified on the b<L\is 
of hcaltll and 
CONCLUSH>N 
TI1e Act was born out of frustration. It 
was a prote;,t against bureaucracy and for 
that reason alone was wannly embraced. 
But in attempting to force a solution sim-
ple in concept to remedy a problem, com-
plex in scope, it was doomed fail. 
Lacking w:L'i a thoughtful integration of 
the permitting process into long-;.,tanding 
con~titution:ll principles inherent in ad-
mini,trativc law. Nor was its interaction 
with the overall land u~e process any bet-
ter thought out. As a rc~ult the JUdici:try 
h;L<; h:lfllstrung the "deemed approval" 
concept to the point where it is \trtually 
mc:mmgless. 
But all h<L" not been lost. The mecha· 
nism for bringing closure to the appli-
cation process through the concept of 
"deemed completeness" appems to he in-
Utct. And even though judicial involve-
ment may be required to gain a penn it ap-
proval, if this remedy um he expedited, 
then t11c goals of the Act arc still part! y at-
tainahle. The reality is that the problems 
nf govemmental delay and inaction. 
which the Act set out to cure, still remam. 
ll1e t;L\k ahead, wl11ch mu~t be underwken 
by the Lcgi\Iature, is to revitalize t11e Act 
to meet thi:' challenge. The reasons to do 
-.n h>dav are more pressing than in 1978. 
TI1e political question is not one of growth 
versus no growth because the Act in no 
wav limits an agencv's ahilitv tn sav no. 
Rather t11e questiOn is one of ·faimes.s . ./ 
Contacts 
David C. Nunenkamp, 
Deputy Director, and 
Christine Kinne, 
Assistant Deputy Director 
Office of Permit Assistance 
Office of Governor Pete Wilson 
1400 lOth Street, Room 108 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 322-8515 
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STATEMENT TO SENATE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
CONCERNING AB 2223 
Robert E. Merritt 
December 17, 1991 
Madam Chairman and Committee Members: 
My name is Robert Merritt. I am a partner in the San 
Francisco office of the law firm of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & 
Enersen. I practice in the area of real estate and land use 
and have authored books and articles on various land use 
topics. I am also an editor of the Land Use Forum, a 
publication of the California Continuing Education of the Bar 
which is a non-profit organization sponsored jointly by the 
State Bar and the University of California. I appreciate the 
opportunity to appear before you today on the subject of the 
Permit Streamlining Act. 
My presentation consists of two parts. First, I will 
spend a few minutes briefing you on the Permit Streamlining Act 
as a way of setting the stage for the testimony on AB 2223. 
Toward the end of the hearing I will reappear to make some 
concrete suggestions as to how the Permit Streamlining Act 
could be improved. 
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My remarks to are 
rather than advocate a particular view 




the Permit Streamlining Act and measures might be 
taken to restore its vitality. 
As you are probably aware, the of the Act when 
enacted in 1977 was to create a more favorable business climate 
in the State by setting a f ite time frame thin which 
permits for development must be acted on. The legislation was 
not intended to shortcut environmental r ew or limit 
power of government--either state or local. It was simply 
designed to "streamline" the process. le frustration th 
bureaucracy is nothing new--a of newsworthy incidents 
gave rise to a surge of interest r reform this area. The 
most notable was the effort of Dow ical to locate a 
petrochemical plant at Coll ille, a small town east of San 
Francisco. Dow spent two lf year over $4.5 
million attempting unsuccess 1 to 65 r ir 
permits. It finally gave up. the main stumbl 
block for Dow was federal--not stat rmits, blame for 
Dow's decision to abandon the project was placed on the state. 
The result was enactment of the t rearnl ing Act which 
sailed through the legislature virtually unopposed and was 
supported by development and environmental interests alike. 
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HOW THE ACT IS SUPPOSE TO WORK! 
I think of the Act as having two stages--the 
application stage and the deemed approval stage. The 
application stage requires the agency to inform the applicant 
for a development permit within 30 days whether or not the 
application is complete. In order to know what to submit, the 
agency is required to keep current a list of information 
required for submittals. If the application is found not to be 
complete, the agency must notify the applicant in writing as to 
deficiencies. If the agency fails to give notice of 
deficiencies within the 30 day period then the application is 
deemed complete. 
Once the application is complete, either because the 
agency notifies the applicant of that fact or the agency fails 
to give notice, the second stage begins. This one is more 
complicated. In its simplest terms, the agency must determine 
what kind of environmental review is required under CEQA. If 
the project is exempt or can be processed under a negative 
declaration, the agency is allowed a period of 180 days to 
approve or deny the application. If an EIR will be required, 
the applicable time is one year. These periods begin running 
from the end of stage one--that is, the date that the 
application is found to be complete or is deemed complete. It 
is possible to extend these time periods for up to 90 days with 
the agreement of both the applicant and the agency. 
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If the agency fails to act within 180 day or one 
year period, the project is deemed approved. In theory is 
should allow the applicant to walk in, pick up the permit and 
start construction. However, things rarely work out that way. 
Due process requires notice and opportunity for hearing for 
many development permits before the permit application can be 
approved. In these cases the Act gives the applicant two 
choices--go to court to order the agency to give notice and 
hold a hearing or resort to self-help by giving public notice. 
Among other things, the public notice must state that unless 
acted upon in 60 days the application will be deemed approved. 
We have not had much experience with applicants 
obtaining deemed approval using either approach. Going to 
court can take a long time and is expensive. Ther ore, there 
1s considerable incentive to using the self-help approach. But 
it has problems as well. In a recent appellate ision, the 
court rejected an applicant's effort to obtain a deemed 
approval using this self-help approach because the applicant 
failed to give adequate notice. Ciani v San Diego Trust & Sav. 
Bank (1991) 233 CA 3d 1604. And, whether self-help can 
overcome constitutional due process objections is yet to be 
determined. 
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WHAT HAS GONE WRONG? 
There are four major problems which prevent the Permit 
Streamlining Act from accomplishing the objective of speedy 
processing of land use entitlements. Most of these problems 
have arisen out of litigation involving the Act. 
1. The Act does not apply to legislative actions 
such as general plan amendments and zoning actions. It applies 
only to adjudicatory decisions such as issuance of use permits 
and tentative subdivision map approvals. This distinction was 
drawn by the Court in Landi v County of Monterey (1983) 139 
CA3d 934, which refused to apply the Act to the rezoning of 18 
acres. Since many projects require legislative action (e.g. 
general plan amendments), these projects cannot move ahead 
until the agency decides to act. The Act provides no help in 
expediting these legislative actions. 
2. There can be no deemed approval under the Act 
unless permit applications are consistent with the general plan 
and other underlying legislative actions as required by state 
law. Various state laws require adjudicatory actions, such as 
approval of tentative subdivision maps, to be consistent with 
the local agency's general plan. In Land Waste Management v 
Board of Supervisors, (1990) 222 CA3d 950, the Court ruled that 
adjudicatory permits (those subject to the Act) will not be 
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deemed approved unless these consi requirements are met. 
This means if an application for a tentative map requires 
amendment of the general plan in order for consistency to 
exist, there can be no deemed approval until that amendment has 
occurred. And we know from Landi that the local agency is 
under no compunction to amend their general plan. Thus the 
whole mechanism for approval can get stalled indefinitely. 
3. The Act may fail to meet constitutional due 
process requirements by not providing an opportunity for a 
hearing. In Horn v County of Ventura (1979) 24 C3d 605, the 
California Supreme Court held that a local agency must provide 
notice and opportunity for hearing when land use decisions 
substantially affect property rights of other landowners. Two 
cases have addressed this issue as it affects deemed approval 
under the Act. Palmer _v City of Ojai (1986) 178 CA3d 280, 
found that the rule set forth in Horn did not apply to the 
Act. But in the later case of Seli~er v City Council (1989) 
216 CA3d 259, the Court disagreed and found the deemed approval 
provisions of the Act unconstitutional. In 1987, the 
legislature amended the Act to provide a means for the 
applicant to give notice in order to obtain deemed approval. 
But this amendment of the Act may not have gone far enough. 
The notice does not guarantee an opportunity for a hearing and 
without such an opportunity the deemed approval mechanism may 
still be constitutionally flawed. 
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The recent case of Ciani v San Diego Trust & Savings 
Bank (1991) 233 CA3d 1604 involved an attempt to achieve a 
deemed approval of a Coastal Act permit by utilizing these 
notice procedures. The Court found that no deemed approval had 
occurred because the applicant failed to give notice to the 
Coastal Commission. Thus, the issue of whether deemed approval 
could occur without an opportunity for a hearing did not 
confront the court. Nevertheless, in an interesting footnote 
the Court observes that even had the notice been proper there 
are still legitimate issues over rights of the public to object 
to the approval and the lack of any findings upon which to base 
an appeal of the approval. (See 233 CA3d at 1615, f. 4). 
4. If deemed approval does work, it is not clear 
exactly what has been approved. In the case of most permits, 
conditions will be attached by the agency which provide 
standards of performance and mitigate environmental impacts. 
Does a deemed approval simply allow the project to proceed 
without any of the usual conditions designed to protect public 
health and safety? Are conditions to be implied? If so, what 
are they? When improvement are to be constructed, do customary 
design standards apply? Can the agency require security for 
performance? Can the agency enact a standard set of conditions 
that apply to all deemed approvals? Could these standards be 
more onerous than would otherwise apply to discourage deemed 
approvals (a "poison pill")? The Act fails to address any of 
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these questions and the few cases that have found deemed 
approvals have never probed these questions. Nevertheless, if 
the Act is to be made to work, these questions must be answered. 
RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACT TO CEQA 
The Permit Streamlining Act followed enactment of CEQA 
by eight years. Although the Act's time limitations turn on 
the kind of environmental analysis required under CEQA, the Act 
does not specifically address the possibility that a deemed 
approval could occur before the CEQA process is complete. CEQA 
provides for a decision to be made on whether a negative 
declaration or EIR will be required within 30 days after an 
application is complete. This time can be extended 15 days if 
both the applicant and agency agree. (Resources Code 
§ 21080.2}. State CEQA Guidelines require that if a negative 
declaration is required, it be completed within 105 days and if 
an EIR is required it shall be certified within one year from 
the time the application is complete. (14 Cal Adrn Code 
§ 15107, 15108). This time can be extended for an EIR if both 
the applicant and the agency agree. Also, if the applicant 
delays the preparation of necessary environmental documents 
these time limits do not apply. If an extension of time is 
given to complete the EIR, the Permit Streamlining Act deemed 
approval date of one year no longer applies and the deadline 
becomes 90 days after certification of the EIR. Although CEQA 
time lines are generally consistent with the Act, they are not 
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binding on the Agency. CEQA does not provide any penalty for 
missing deadlines, and for that reason the courts treat the 
timelines as merely directory rather than mandatory. (Meridian 
Ocean Systems v State Lands Comm'n (1990) 222 CA3d 153). 
Therefore it is quite easy to have the situation arise that 
resulted in AB 2223--a deemed approval deadline, but no 
completed EIR. Under existing law it's not clear what happens 
next. 
In the Land Waste Management case, the Court rejects 
the idea that the EIR can be deemed certified by expiration of 
the time limits under the Act. What the Court does not say, 
but one can imply, is that without the EIR being certified the 
project cannot be deemed approved. AB 2223 says this in no 
uncertain terms. 
Two other alternatives to denying deemed approval for 
lack of a certified EIR are mentioned in your briefing paper. 
One is to impose a one year deadline on preparation of an 
EIR (and presumably a 180 day deadline on preparation of a 
negative declaration) which would overrule the court's holding 
on this issue in Land Waste Management. The effect would be to 
allow the project to go ahead without an EIR if it were not 
completed. A second approach is to toll or suspend the deemed 
approval until a fixed time elapses (e.g. 45 days) after the 
CEQA process is complete. I have suggested this tolling in a 
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similar situation--the failure of agency to take 
legislative actions that are prerequisites to permit issuance. 
I anticipate you will hear the pros and cons of these 
approaches in the testimony that follows. This concludes my 
briefing and I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 
PART 2 
In my opening remarks I pointed to many of the 
problems with the current Permit Streamlining Act--that it does 
not operate as to legislative actions, the conflict with state 
law consistency requirements, due process concerns, not knowing 
what deemed approval means and, of course, the CEQA concern 
that is the focus of AB 2223. I would like to leave you with 
some suggestions. 
Thought should be g to whether the cone of 
"deemed approval" is real the best enforcement ism. I 
am sure it was initially favored because it seemed quick and 
efficient, but to the contrary it s become complicated and 
proved unworkable. I suggest eliminating "deemed approval" and 
replacing it with a summary judicial proceeding. In other 
words, if the agency fails to meet its deadline for taking 
action under the Act, following reasonable notice to the 
agency, the applicant could petition the court to issue a 
premptory writ of mandate directing the agency to act on the 
application. The Act should provide for a simple form of 
5437M 
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petition and response, limit the issues to whether the time 
limits under the Act had been exceeded, and allow the court to 
summarily issue the writ directing the agency to act after 
affording the agency the opportunity to respond. The court 
could issue the writ based on pleadings and affidavits without 
oral argument. The order could be made non-appealable. If 
successful, the applicant should be awarded attorney's fees and 
the court could be authorized to award a multiple of these fees 
in cases where the agency acted capriciously in disregarding 
the time lines under the Act. 
Compelling the agency pursuant to court order to take 
action puts teeth into the Act and eliminates the concerns that 
have plagued deemed approvals. To insure CEQA compliance, the 
court's order would require the agency to complete and certify 
the EIR or adopt the negative declaration, as appropriate, 
within the time set for acting on the permit. In setting a 
time within which the agency must act, the court can consider 
reasonable requests for extensions to comply with CEQA. The 
action taken by the agency could then be reviewed on appeal as 
with any administrative decision and permit approvals would be 
conditioned to require adherence to standard requirements of 
the agency. The key to this approach is to fashion the 
judicial remedy so that it is limited to a single issue (i.e. 
compliance with time limits), readily available and results in 
cost to the agency for dragging its feet. 
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A more moderate proposal would be to keep deemed 
approval, but allow it to be invoked only a hearing has 
been held. The Act now provides for this alternative, but 
pursuing the action under standard mandate procedures is 
expensive and time consuming. Providing a summary form of 
judicial mandate action and taxing the cost to the agency as I 
have described would encourage its use. The problem is that 
if, after holding a hearing, the agency still does not take 
action the difficulties with deemed approval still remain. 
Another way the Act can be strengthened is by 
eliminating the legislative versus adjudicatory distinction 
created by Landi. While the Act should probably not compel 
action on general plan amendments because they frequently raise 
broad policy issues of consequence to an entire community, it 
should be made to apply to applications for legislative actions 
that are site specific, such as a rezoning requests relating to 
a particular parcel for which development permits are requested. 
Finally, I think there are some other ways in which 
the Act can be improved--if you will, "streamlined." It would 
help to prescribe a standard cover page applicable to 
applications under the Act, to eliminate as a prerequisite for 
the Act to apply that the applicant submit a signed statement 
indicating whether the project is located on any listed 
hazardous waste site, and to provide for a standard submittal 
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package when the agency has failed to develop the required list 
of information for applications. If deemed approval remains in 
the Act, then agencies should be required to adopt measures 
defining what it means. Most significantly, the whole 
entitlement process can be streamlined if efforts are made to 
simplify the CEQA process. I believe this can be done without 
sacrificing protection of the environment, but that is the 
subject for a different day. 
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Honorable Committee Members - Good afternoon. 
I am Franklin Eberhard, Chief Deputy Director of Planning For the City of 
Los Angeles. 
Thank you very much for asking me to speak to you on this matter. I am 
aware that time is limited so I will make my comments short. 
Briefly, the City of Los Angeles believes there is a strong need to amend 
the Permit Streamlining Act in order to carry out spirit and intent of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The current act requires 
approval or disapproval of a project within one year if an EIR is required 
or within 6 months if a negative declaration is issued. If an action is not 
taken with in these time limits and the applicant chooses to avail himself 
of the provisions of the current permit streamlining act, the project is 
"deemed approved by operation of law". For a jurisdiction of our size 
and complexity these time limits are too stringent when projects which 
are environmentally controversial or complex are being considered. Our 
reasons for concern are outlined as follows: 
1 . Issues which are extremely complex or controversial are often not 
quickly resolved. The six month time limit on negative declarations 
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does not adequately allow for preparation of a full initial study, 
publishing the results, receiving comment, responding to public 
comment and or redoing and publishing of a new initial study and 
negative declaration. This process can take up to 6 months or more 
to accomplish if the issues are sufficiently complex and full review by 
applicant, public agencies and the public as intended by CEQA is 
accomplished. If not appropriately settled pursuant to CEQA rules, 
then appeals and litigation relating to CEQA compliance can delay a 
project for lengthy periods of time defeating the purpose of the 
Permit Streamlining Act. 
2. A project which is "deemed approved by operation of law" before 
public input and hearings on the entitlement process occur effectively 
denies neighbors and an impacted public effective input into the 
decision making process. 
3. A project which is "deemed approved by operation of law" may not be 
thoroughly reviewed an exactions imposed on it which would normally 
be required of it by the local government. By this I mean adequate 
traffic control measures, street lights, street trees, fire hydrants 
and the like all necessitated by the project might not be required 
except those which would normally be required by the building permit 
process. This is particularly important where significantly adverse 
environmental impacts might result unless adequate mitigations are 
required of the project during the entitlement process. 
Amending the Permit Streamlining Act to provide that a project be 
deemed to be approved by operation of law if the local jurisdiction does 
not act on the matter within the times now specified by the law or within 
60 days of completion of the final environmental clearance which ever 
comes last would solve this problem. 
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I would like briefly to describe to you the background from which I am 
addressing you. The City of Los Angeles Planning Department 
processes approximately 14,000 discretionary actions in a busy year 
ranging from simple plan or site plan approvals to extremely complex 
projects involving many complex entitlements. All involve some form of 
environmental clearance. Of those 14,000 actions about 25 require 
and another 1200 acquire either a negative declaration or mitigated 
negative declaration. While seeking to comply with CEQA, both as to the 
letter of the law and to its spirit and intent, the City struggles 
produce environmental actions suitable to each project in an expeditious 
and efficient manner. We have been quite successful in this endeavor as 
to the processing of negative declarations and are still struggling with 
the production of EIRs in a more timely manner. 
We have, however, been impacted by the Permit Streamlining Act. The 
provisions of the act were invoked on a property located in the Venice 
Community of Los Angeles at 601 Ocean Front Walk. The project is 
described as a 3 story 18,925 square foot shopping center with 152 
on-site parking spaces. The applicant requested a project permit under a 
current interim control ordinance, a yard variance requesting a zero foot 
setback on a side yard, a zone variance to permit compact parking 
spaces in excess of the maximum number established by the Municipal 
Code, a conditional use for a mini-mall and a conditional use to sell 
alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption. All were combined into one 
proceeding and environmental clearance. The project is located in an 
extremely congested area which also experiences severe off-street 
parking problems. 
A number of valid issues were raised by opponents of the project 
challenging the mitigated negative declaration issued by the Planning 
Department. They included the following: 
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1 . Analysis of the impacts caused by traffic generated by the project. 
2. Adequacy of analysis of cumulative impacts in the traffic study of 
this and neighboring projects in the traffic study which is a part of 
the initial study leading to a mitigated negative declaration for the 
project. 
3. Adequacy of off-street parking provided by the applicant. 
4. Noise created by the project and its impact on surrounding residents. 
Resolution of these issues caused the retrieval of the original mitigated 
negative declaration and the issuance of a second negative declaration. 
The time taken to resolve these issues exceeded the six months 
allocated to do so by the permit streamlining act for such processes. 
While clearly the City's handling of the matter is also at issue in this 
matter, the legitimate environmental controversy engendered by this 
case caused delays which exceeded those allowed. 
After after 1 7 months of the application having been deemed complete 
by the City, the applicant exercised his right to have the project "deemed 
approved by operation of law" and the Zoning Administrator adhered to 
his request on advice of the City Attorney. The matter was then 
appealed to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals who granted the appeal 
and reversed the Zoning Administrator's action. The applicant filed suit 
against the City which was subsequently settled by the City and applicant 
granting the requested project entitlements. The project being located 
in the California Coastal Zone was then required to acquire a coastal 
development permit from the Coastal Commission which was granted 
with conditions by that Commission. The matter, however, is not over 
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because local residents have challenged City's 
suit in court. The matter is still being litigated. 
Again I would like to impress on the City's and my belief 
Permit Streamlining Act needs be amended so as to permit full 
examination and review of project in accordance with CEQA. To fail to do 
so would defeat both the aims of CEQA and permit streamlining act due 
to there inherent conflicts with each other. Amending the Permit 
Streamlining Act to provide that a proiect be deemed to be approved by 
operation of law if the local jurisdiction does not act on the matter within 
the times now specified by the law or within 60 days of completion of the 
final environmental clearance which ever comes last would solve this 
problem. 
Thank you very much for your attention. I would pleased to answer 
any questions which might have on matter. 
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Re: Assembly Bill 2223 (Moore) 
Permit Streamlining Issues 
Merr~ers of the Corrmittee: 
le :or Livable and Active neighborhoods in Los .;ngeles, 
PLAN/LA, is a coalition of over 150 neighborhood groups stretching 
across Los .;ngeles from Sun Valley to San In the matter 
before you, we are specifical representing the ?ederation of 
Hillside Emd Canyon .:,.ssociations, cely 50 homeowner 
associations locat in the Hol Hills and the Santa Monica 
Hountains. We are here i:1 support of the proposed amendraent 
(AB2223) to the law known as the "Permit Streamlining Act". 
* CEQA must come first 
* Community groups cannot rely on the courts to 
resolve eve~ issue 
* Due Process for adjoining property owners must be 
protected, including appeal options 
vJe l:ll·mj_y l:elieve that no permit applicati:::m ~hould be "deemed 
app " r::riol· to the completion of the CSQ.::. process and notice of 
such corr.p le:::. ion has been lawfully filed. Co::.:c:unl c::· gro·~ps r:1us t 
1-el:/ 1-~ec~ .. ·~l-1'" 0.:1 rhe r:ro\liSlon.s of ~he Cali£cr~~:a 2nviror1rnental 
Quality .:..c: t.CE(.:'\) for proteccion. :ror;; signi:icant irr.pacts 
emanating :r:m de~elcpment prOJects. :~e a en t lD a posltlon, as 
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volunteer organ1:::::at1ons, to careful nize each and every 
application before a local jurisdiction, then, if an issue 
ar1ses, to be forced to s relief from +- court in cases where '-
the local agency fails to act in a time manner. 
It is essential, as underscored by the Oceanfront ~~alk case, that 
act be clarified to provide for full CEQA compliance prior to any 
such "deemed approval". In the staff a1scussion of 
alternative approaches, we come down on the side of the 
First" option. It is our opinion that CEQA requires compliance 
prior to any discretionary action on the part of a local agency as 
v;as implied in the Land h'aste Management case. 
We do not believe that the same deadlines can used in both CEQA 
and the Streamlining .L.ct. lJo penalties are provided for failure to 
comply with the deadlines indicated in CEQA. In practice, most 
complicat EIR's require a nimum of 12 months to prepare and 
many extend vJell beyond that t frame. Allowing the one year 
limit contained in Streamlining Act to stand would result in 
numerous major projects ing deemed approved without mitigation, 
forcing the courts to step in and attempt to determine mitigation 
after the fact. Com.rnunity groups must not placed in 
position of relying en the courts to deal wi individual cases. 
In response to this very issue, the City of Los Angeles will not 
deem an application complete until the CEQA process 
completed. 
Tolling 1s a possible solution to this dilemma. \·Je would advocate 
that one year clock be suspended at such c as local 
ager: _ _: -:-; "' L t EIR ::..s necessar.1. The <:lock could be 
restarted once the ft EIR is released for public comment, or 
after the final EIR 1s relaeas would allow sufficient time 
for the agencies t 1 with the application. 







in i t at t em;,J t s l 
s the many problems 
th this narrow 
th the Act. 
It appears that in cases involving t due process rights of other 
parties in interest, the applicant cannot rely on the St~eamlining 
Act i~ seeking an app~oval, wit t notice a hearing. However, 
the .-:__c- (or c:his proposed a:-r,endinent) es not clari what happens 
if ncc:ice is given and a hearing is held, yet the agency still 
fai:s :o ct. The ence of findings and cc~diticns in such a 
approval" do not appear to be worth mu whi is as it 
clarified t:o remove su 
cases :rem c:ne purv~ew of the legislacion enti~e 




Hence we are left ~ith "ministerial" reviews, wn1cn in the City of 
Los Angeles, ~ow revolves around a process called Site Plan Review. 
The language of the Act as written still does not deal with the 
question of findings or conditions that might apply to projects 
"deemed ::~pproved". Hence appeals rights that accrue to the 
neighbors in any subsequent dispute may be compromised. 
It is obvious that the Streamlining Act must be compatible with 
CEQ.;;., or our environ.rnental protection laws ·will be severely 
compromised. It is also fair to say that some degree of certainty 
must be imposed on the permitting system. Ideally the law should 
mandate notice, a hearing and a decision on any development 
application within one year. 
Two alternatives are available to a.cn1eve this. The first option 
would allow this time frame to tolled at the point of 
determina.tion of the need for a. mitigated negative declaration or 
an EIR. The clock would restart upon publication of the mitigated 
negati?e declaration or the release of the Final EIR. The second 
option would :allow the L.Z\ City Planning model which presently 
req'.Jires CEQA to be complete before an applicacion is deemed 
con;plete. Both could apply to projects involving d·..1e process, as 
well as "ministerial" applications. 
The issues of mandating a hearing, findings and conditions then 
become more acute. Nitigations contained in the CEQ.Z... clearance 
sho~:ld automatically become conditions. Standard findings and 
conditions should also prevail in any "deemed approval". 
In :::.he ~ nter 
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Brentwood Community Federation 
Handeville Canyon Association 
Lower Mandeville Canyon Association 
Brentwood Hills Association 
Brentwood Homeowners Association 
Brent~ood Terrace Homeowners Association 
Crestwood Hills Association 
South Brentwood Homeowners Association 
Sullivan Canyon Property Owners Association 
Coastal Area Support Team (COAST) 
Villa Marina Council 
Villa Marina East 
Presidents Row Neighborhood 
Venice Town Council 
Zanja Neighborhood Residents Association 
Vista Del Mar Neighborhood ~ssociation 
FLi of Ballona Wetlands 
Homeowners Organized to Nonitor the Enviromenc (HOME) 
Del Rey Homeowners Association 
East Los Angeles 
Neighborhood Action Co~mittee 
Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations 
Bel Air Association 
E:~l 7-:.ir Knol2.s 
Ber-.~.::..r SK:.,·c::.-~st 
Benedict Canyon .?J,ssociation 
~ever:y Cres: ~cmec~ners Association 
Beverly Glen Park 
PLAN/LA l·~erncership ?,)_;tet· 
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?age 2 
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Beverly Highlands Homes Association 
Briar Summit Homeowners Association 
Briarcliff Improvement Association 
Cahuenga Pass Property Owners Association 
Casiano Estates Homeowners Association 
Coldwater Canyon 
Curson Canyon 
Echo Park Improvement Association 
Encino Property Owners 
Franklin Hills Residents Association 
Franklin-Hollywood Blvd. West 
Friends of Caballero Canyon 
Glassell Park Improvement Association 
Glenridge Homeowners Association 
Homeowners of Encino 
The Highland's Owners Association 
Hillside Village Property Owners Association 
Hollywood Crescent 
Holl~vood Dell Civic Association 
Hollywood Heights Association 
Hollywood Hills Inmprovement Association 
Hollywood Knolls Community Club 
Holl~voodland Improvement Association 
Lake Hollywood Homeowners Association 
Laurel Canyon Association 
Lookout Mountain Associates 
Los Feliz Improvement Association 
Miramar Homeownwers Association 
Mountaingate Community Association 
Mt. Olyrr,pes ;rope:rt:y Owners .;ssociation 
Mt. Washington Association 
Mulholland Property Owners Association 
North Beverly Dr. Franklin Canyon Association 
Nichols Canyon Association 
Outpost Homeowners Association 
Pacific Palisades Residents Association 
Residents of Beverly Glen 
Roscomare Valley Association 
Sherman Oaks Homeowners Association 
Studio City Residents Association 
Sunset Plaza Civic Association 
Tarzana Property Owners Association 
The Eagle Rock Association (T.E.R.A.) 
Topp of the Canyon Association 
Torreyson/Flynn Association 
~hitley Hei ts Ci~ic Association 
Wonderland Park ~eighborhood Assoc ation 
PLt\N/LA Hembership R·:.stcL· 
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LA Crusaders 
CAN Community Action Network 
NAC Neighborhoods Against Crime 
COBRA Citizen Opposing Burglary Robbery & hssault 
Friends of St. Basil's Church 
Inner City Alliance 
Pico Union Housing Corporation 
HollyNOOd-Wilshire Committee on Aging 
Helrose Hill North End Committee 
Brezee Foundation 
Drexel Avenue Neighborhood Watch 
Rampart Rangers 
East Hollywood Neighborhood vJatch 
vlilshire Center Community Involvement Associat:.ion 
Mid-Cities 
Baldwin Hills Neighborhood Homeowners Association 
Kinney Heights Homeowners Association 
Western Heights Neighborhood Association 
Country Club Park Neighborhood Asocciation 
San Fernando Valley Federation 
... .. " ~-. ' 
~o~eo~ners o: ~nc~no 
Sunland-Tujunga Association of Residents 
~~n Nuys Homeowners Association 
Hansen Hills Homeowners Association, Inc. 
Lakeview Terrace Improvement ll.ssociation 
Lakeview Terrace Homeowners Association 
Porter Ranch is Developed Enough (PRIDE} 
Pacoima Property Owners Association, Inc. 
Northridge Civic Association 
North Valley Homeowners Federation 
North Hollywood Residents Association 
'IJes t Hills Cominuni ty Organization 
?,eseda Community Association 
S.T.O.?. of North Hollywood 
Valley Village Homeowners Association 
Friends of Caballero Canyon 
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Fales Verdes Shores 
Point F'ermin 
Rol~ing Hills Riveria 
San Pedro Harbor 




RPV Homeowners Council 
South East Central Homeowners Assocition, Inc. 
Westside Civic Federation 
Beverly ~~.ngeles 
Beverly Roxbu1y 
Beverly Wilshire Homes Association 
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CaL.::':ornia Countr_1 Club Homeovmers Associat.ion 
Car:~ay Circ~e Homeowners Association 
Che'v·:::.ot Hills Homeovmers Jl.ssociation 
Holcby :·:est·,;ood Property Owners Association 
Melrose Action Coalition 
Miracle Mile Residential Association 
Roxbury- Beverwi 1 
Sout~ Carthay Neighborhood Association 
South of Burton Way Association 
Tract. 7260 
West~ood Gardens Civic Association 
Westwood South of Santa Monica 
~es:side Village Civic Associc.tion 
PLAN/LA Membcr.:;hip Rm:;UT 




Banning Park Neighborhood Association 
Wilmington Home Owners 
New Wilmington Committee 
L.A. Harbor Boat Owners 
WIN Neighborhood Association 
Wilmington North Neighborhood Association 
Wilshire Homeowners Alliance 
Brookside Homeowners Association 
Fremont Place Association 
Hancock Park Homeowners Association 
Larc0~ont Village Homeowners Association 
Windsor Square Association 
Windsor Village Association 
Boulevard Heights Homeowners Association 
Oxford Square Association 
Ridgewood-Wilton Neighborhood Association 
Others 
Elysian Valley Property Owners, Renters & Businessmen's 
.~ssociation 
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on Assembly Bill 2223 
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Senator Bergeson and Committee Members: 
There is not a shred of doubt that the legislature should 
clarify the relationship between the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA) and the Permit Streamlining Act. The 
existing ambiguity virtually assures needless litigation, which 
creates higher costs to project proponents and invites 
inconsistent results. There is no reason to postpone action 
until a nuclear power plant or a toxic waste incinerator is 
"deemed approved" with no safety conditions. 
The ambiguity must be resolved by making compliance with 
CEQA a condition precedent to the application of the Permit 
streamlining Act. The CEQA process serves two critical 
purposes that would be subverted by any other solution. First, 
the public would lose its "privileged position" in the 
environmental review process, since a deemed approval 
effectively cuts off public input -- in some instances, before 
there has been any opportunity whatsoever for public review of 
a project. This would further erode trust in our governmental 
institutions at a time when we can ill afford this. 
Second, the agency (and indirectly, the public) would lose 
the ability to impose mitigation measures to counter the 
adverse environmental impacts of a project. Because the Permit 
Streamlining Act does not provide any means for imposing 
mitigation measures on a permit that is "deemed approved," full 
compliance with CEQA is critical if appropriate mitigation 
measures are to be imposed on projects that are approved under 
the Permit Streamlining Act. 
By limiting "deemed approval" to cases in which the agency 
has completed the CEQA process, AB 2223 in effect adopts a 
variation of the tolling concept advocated by Robert E. Merritt 
in "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the Reality," 1 
Land Use Forum 30 (1991). Once the applicable deadline under 
the Permit Streamlining Act has passed, the agency should be 
required to act on the project application(s) within a short 
time after it certifies the EIR, approves the negative 
declaration, or takes other action to complete its CEQA review. 
The post-CEQA time period can be fairly short; 45 to 90 days 
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should allow the agency sufficient opportunity to consider the 
applications in light of the information provided through the 
environmental review process. 
The crocodile tears shed by project applicants over the 
delays in environmental review do not bring much sympathy from 
the public, which is often forced to wait years beyond the time 
limits of the Permit Streamling Act for action on broad policy 
documents, such as General and Specific Plans, that will affect 
thousands of people. For example, efforts to adopt a Local 
Coastal Plan for the Venice area have taken over four years. 
Work on a Specific Plan for the Maxella-Glencoe area is in its 
third year even though there is no public controversy -- the 
homeowners, renters, business owners and property owners have 
worked together to reach concensus on both goals and 
implementation. 
The public has no equivalent to the Permit Streamlining 
Act. We must simply wait until the environmental review of our 
General Plans, our Coastal Plan, and our Specific Plans 
is completed by the various departments of the responsible 
public agency. Adding a firm deadline to the CEQA timeline 
would statutorily place the interests of the development 
community ahead of the interests of the public at large. This 
is not good public policy. 
A stringent deadline for completing the CEQA process also 
ignores the reality that the larger a project, and the more 
adverse its impacts, the longer the CEQA review takes. As an 
example, a critical aspect of the EIR is the requirement that 
the lead agency respond to comments on the draft document. 
This gives the public "an opportunity to test, assess, and 
evaluate the data and make an informed judgment as to the 
validity of the conclusions to be drawn therefrom." Sutter 
Sensible Planning, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 122 Cal.App.3d 
813, 822 (1981). Those projects with the most negative impacts 
-- for example, a toxic waste incinerator -- are likely to 
require a relatively longer amount of time to prepare the 
required "reasoned response" than projects such as an apartment 
complex. It is simply not reasonable to require that all EIR's 
be completed within one year. 
What will happen if you require strict compliance with the 
CEQA time guidelines for every project, and the penalty for 
delay is deemed approval? The most environmentally damaging 
projects will be most likely to be deemed approved. 
Moreover, the opposite rule -- allowing a deemed approval 
under the Permit Streamlining Act without CEQA compliance --
could actually have the unexpected consequence of increasing 
the likelihood that project approvals would be overturned. 
Such a rule would lengthen the time in which a project opponent 
could file a CEQA challenge: instead of the 30-day statute of 
limitation that governs lawsuits for projects with either EIR's 
or negative declarations, project opponents would have 180 days 
to file a lawsuit under the statute of limitation that governs 
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of limitation, with the fact that it 
icult for an opponent to overturn an 
project applicant might 
laggardly agency to finish 
suit that is likely overturn the deemed 
Finally, there is enough litigation over environmental 
disputes without adding "CEQA vs. The Permit Streamlining Act." 
All of the potential cases with this subheading could be 
resolved in advance with the passage of this bill. 
I would suggest two improvements to AB 2223. First, the 
bill should establish a specific event that signals the end of 
the environmental review. This will prevent the otherwise 
inevitable litigation over whether an agency has "complied with 
CEQA" as of any given date. 
Most important, the Permit Streamlining Act must specify 
that a "deemed approval 11 includes both 1) the standard 
conditions that are normally imposed by an agency (such as a 
school impact fee) and 2) the conditions or mitigation measures 
identified during the CEQA process. 
These conditions are at the heart of the public interest. 
They range from critical policy matters, such as requiring the 
replacement of lost affordable housing, the funding of 
transportation mitigations and the use of permeable paving 
materials to reduce water-polluting urban run-off, to more 
subtle issues that directly a the quality of life for both 
project residents and tenants and their neighbors, such as 
landscape buffers, reasonable operating hours, and providing 
room for recycling containers. 
It is meaningless to require completion of CEQA review 
before deemed approval if the results are not going to be used 
for something. I urge you to address the issue of conditions, 
adopt the tolling concept with respect to CEQA compliance, and 
pass a bill resolving these before this state wastes 
more of its resources in unnecessary litigation. 
Thank you for your consideration of these concerns. 
Sincerely, 
Debra L. Bowen 
cc: Assemblywoman Gwen Moore 
Councilwoman Ruth Galanter 
Frank Eberhard, Acting Planning Director, City of Los 
Angeles 
Mr. John Powers, COAST 
Mr. Bill Christopher, PLAN-LA 
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The Honorable Marian Bergeson 
Chairman 
Senate Committee on Local Government 
Room 2085, State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 94248 
Dear Senator Bergeson: 
I appreciate the opportunity to testify with regard to 
Assembly Bill 2223 relating to amendments to California 
Government Code §65956, the operative provision of the law 
commonly known as the Permit Streamlining Act. I represent 
Stephen M. Blanchard, an individual whose plans for development 
of property in the Venice area of the City of Los Angeles, seems 
to be the catalyst for this legislative change. I believe that 
the legislative change which is sought in this bill is not in the 
best interest of the people of the State of California. 
The Permit Streamlining Act was adopted in 1977. It 
was introduced by then Assembly Speaker McCarthy and passed with 
bipartisan support and was signed by Governor Brown. In his 
press release of October 2, 1977, the Governor stated: 
This measure required early cooperation between state 
and local agencies on major projects; sets a one-year 
deadline for lead agency permit decisions; and 
consolidated public hearings and environmental impact 
documents. AB 884 helps guarantee that every proposed 
development receives a prompt and fair hearing and 
meets the governor's 1975 commitment to "cut through 
the tangle of overlapping environmental and land use 
rules which delay needed construction." 
The purpose for which the Permit Streamlining Act was adopted is 
as important today as it was in 1977 and the proposed legislation 
would effectively negate the Permit Streamlining Act entirely. 
Assembly Bill 2223 would require that no permit could 
be deemed approved unless a final action has been taken on a 
negative declaration or an environmental impact report. 
Therefore, although there are time limits for completion of these 
processes under the California Environmental Quality Act, there 
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is no penalty for the failure to meet such ime deadlines. Only 
the Permit Streamlining Act prov des any effective measure to 
compel state or local government to act in a timely manner. Only 
the existence of the Permit Streamlining Act over the past 14 
years has resulted in timely decisions. AB 2223 would remove 
this incentive for the government to act timely. 
When the Permit Streamlining Act was passed, the 
impetus for the law was the failure of the state and local 
agencies to be able to determine whether or not to grant a permit 
for the construction of an important industrial plant which 
ultimately became located in another state. Rather than 
discourage needed development for the citizens of this State, the 
Permit Streamlining Act assured those who would expend the 
substantial sums necessary to apply for permits that they would 
receive prompt action by the government. The Enrolled Bill 
Report prepared for the Governor by the Resources Agency on 
September 27, 1977 stated that the subject was "speeding up the 
permit and CEQA process" and stated clearly "[i]f an agency fails 
to act on an application within the time limit required, that 
agency's permit would be automatically approved." 
My experience is a clear basis on which the 
effectiveness of the Permit Streamlining Act can be assessed. On 
my client's behalf r filed an application to build small 
commercial project on a C-2 zoned property in the Ci of Los 
Angeles. Due to the complexi of the City's ordinances, six 
separate discretionary permits were required (alt all 
permits are consolidated into a single hearing process). Four 
permit applications were filed on October 13, 1988. The City 
notified us that two additional applications were required and 
those were filed on anuary 13, 1989 and all applications for the 
project were deemed complete the City on that date. 
A public hearing was held on April 10, 1989. Public 
notice was given to all surrounding owners and tenants. Many 
people attended the hearing. More than a year later, the City 
had still not acted on the permit. The reason for this delay was 
that the environmental review process had not been completed. 
Although the City proposed a mitigated negative declaration on 
October 11, 1989, opponents of the project insisted that an 
environmental impact report was required. (The City also failed 
to include all permits in the mitigated negative declaration.) 
The City examined the objections and issued a new mitigated 
negative declaration on February 7, 1990. The opponents 
continued to object and appealed this decision. 
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On May 5, 1990, with no decision having been reached, I 
demanded that the City comply with the Permit Streamlining Act 
and deem our permits approved so that we could then proceed to 
the California Coastal Commission. The City Attorney agreed. The 
City Board of Zoning Appeals disagreed. The project stalemated 
for another year until the City settled the dispute by agreeing 
to issue the permits. An appeal to the Coastal Commission ensued 
which approved the project with conditions on November 14, 1991. 
Still dissatisfied, project opponents have continued with 
litigation and tomorrow will seek a preliminary injunction in Los 
Angeles Superior Court. More than three years after filing his 
applications (which were only filed after a year of meetings with 
community groups), the property owner is still unable to build. 
Why does this set of circumstances exist? It is 
because opponents to development are willing to exploit unfairly 
the environmental laws of this State to delay and (hopefully like 
Dow Chemical) defeat the development not through a decision but 
through the absence of a decision. Without a time limit like 
that in the Permit Streamlining Act, these activities will be 
encouraged. The Permit Streamlining Act is not directed at the 
time occupied for making a decision on a project but rather at 
the time for environmental review. It is during this period that 
overstated objections, false and misleading information, unfair 
characterizations and conclusions and other charges are levelled 
at a project. Under CEQA each objection requires analysis and 
review, even if without merit. Even when the initial 
environmental reviewer reaches a conclusion, he can be bombarded 
with objections to his conclusion and ultimately an appeal on the 
environmental document alone. 
A determination to issue a negative declaration is 
almost always challenged in a controversial project on the 
grounds that an environmental impact report should be prepared. 
Most cities and counties, like the City of Los Angeles, do not 
finalize the environmental determination except in conjunction 
with the action on the permit itself. Therefore, every delay in 
an environmental process becomes a delay in the permit process. 
How does the Permit Streamlining Act cure these 
problems. By placing a time deadline under which all parties 
must operate, the City is compelled to adopt procedures which 
result in prompt decision making. A file cannot sit on a 
planners desk for weeks because he does not want to deal with a 
controversial issue. Opponents to projects must be economical in 
their objections. Not every project has catastrophic 
environmental effects. However, to read a sample of the 
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objections to my client's project, you would think it were a 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and not a commercial project in a 
commercial zone. Opponents will be discouraged from badgering 
City employees who make decisions they do not like. Opponents 
will have an equal interest in the prompt decision and will stop 
debating procedural or impact issues which are truly 
insignificant and deal with the real policy issues which are 
raised by a development. 
Before the Committee acts it should inquire as to 
whether or not the effect of the present Permit Streamlining Act 
has resulted in unwarranted or harmful development. If the best 
those who wish to amend the law can point to is one small 
commercial building in a commercial zone in the City of Los 
Angeles (a commercial building which met the strenuous 
requirements of the California Coastal Commission) then there 
seems little reason for a change. Indeed, the Committee should 
be congratulating itself that the Permit Streamlining Act worked 
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Since its inception the Permit Streamlining Act has conflicted with the California 
Environmental Quality Act. Recent examples which will be discussed at this hearing include 
the City of Los Angeles City Council's attempts to review staff CEQA determinations and 
its status as respondent in lawsuits filed by both applicants and project neighbors. The City 
of Sausalito is also litigating issues of the conflicts between CEQA and the Permit 
Streamlining Act. There, a project was deemed approved despite expert agency comments 
on an Environmental Impact Report that the applicant's project was so poorly designed that 
human lives could be lost from geologic failure. Finally, a recent decision involving the City 
of San Diego demonstrates that a literal reading of the Permit Streamlining Act may result 
in an impermissible deprivation of third party due process rights. (Ciani v. San Diego Trust 
& Savings Bank 233 Cal.App.3d 1604, 1615 [Sept.1991].) 
In sum, the land use approval process requires the delicate balancing of a number of issues 
and criteria. The Planning and Zoning Act, the California Endangered Species Act, and the 
California Clean Air Act each have their own set of issues which locally elected officials 
must evaluate. It is the environmental review process under CEQA which provides the 
umbrella under which all of the health, safety and environmental criteria must be assessed. 
In stark contrast to the myriad of environmental protections provided by the legislature over 
the past twenty years, the Permit Streamlining Act appears to override all of the other 
concerns by erecting a litmus test for review of development projects and a troubling 
corallary: "If the review takes more than one-year, the project must be deemed approved; 
If the environmental analysis takes more than one-year, you may not use it." 
It is time to reconsider the Permit Streamlining Act. 
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Both Government Code 
Resources Code section 21 
a 365-day period from the at which an application is accepted as complete 
take specified governmental actions. Under CEQA, a lead agency must 
Environmental Impact Report within its one year rule. Certification establishes that 
EIR "has been completed in compliance with CEQA" and that the lead agency has 
the information within the EIR prior to approving the project. (Cal. Code of Regs. 
15090.) Under PSA, a lead agency must approve or deny a project within one year. Since 
both of these timelines begin running at the same time, it is possible that the one year rule 
will run before the lead agency has the opportunity to hold hearings on the project, to 
deliberate its merits and to make a fully informed decision. While the CEQA process may 
be complete, no time will be left for project review by the decision makers. If the elected 
decision makers are not ready to act on the day of certification, the project is "deemed 
approved". That is, the applicant's proposal is approved by act of law, with no conditions, 
mitigations, or other limitations to protect the public health and safety, including the 
environment. 
The PSA Allows the Applicant to Control the Process 
Over time and in response to judicial disapproval of the sometimes draconian results of the 
one year rule, various attempts at extending the time lines have been adopted. Under the 
PSA, a single 90-day extension of the time to approve or deny may be granted =--~ 
applicant consents. While a voluntary written extension may be granted by an applicant. 
It also happens that agency-applicant discussions of conditions and process continue, 
implicitly indicating a waiver of the one-year rule, until 365 days pass and the applicant's 
attorney demands permit issuance. This abuse of the Permit Streamlining Act is involved 
in recent litigation against the City of Sausalito. 
CEQA also allows "reasonable extensions" of one-year rule for an EIR, if the 
applicant consents. While flexibility in the CEQA limitations is important both 
in reviewing the complicated projects which warrant an EIR and in assuring that CEQA's 
substantive environmental provisions are carried out, existing law inadequately serves lead 
agencies. First, an applicant can force a local agency to speed through the CEQA process 
in order to meet the arbitrary one-year rule by withholding consent for an extension. 
Second, many interpret the PSA and CEQA rules to mean that CEQA's "reasonable 
extensions" are limited to one ninety day extension to certify and one ninety day PSA 
extension to act. Applicant attorneys often read the 90-day extension in the Government 
Code as a limitation on the more open ended CEQA extension language. In either instance, 
it is the applicant which controls the process. 
The applicant's control is not illusory. It is common with controversial projects for 
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environmental groups and other project opponents to begin threatening CEQA suits ahead 
of the time that the EIR is even prepared. Local officials then find themselves wedged 
between a developer threatening to invoke CEQA's one-year rule to force a premature EIR 
and NIMBY groups threatening to litigate even the slightest analytical defect. If the CEQA 
analysis is faulty, the public will pursue costly litigation. If the agency requires more than 
a year to complete the analysis, the applicant can assert the PSA's deemed approved 
provisions and litigate to force issuance of the permits. Other witnesses have testified that 
the City of Los Angeles was involved recently in this double bind. 
CEOA Intends to Limit Approvals to Projects Where 
Environmental Consequences are Known and 
Alternatives or Mitigation Imposed 
The policies of CEQA are clear. 
"The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the state that public 
agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or 
feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially lessen the significant 
environmental effects of such projects .... 
* * * 
The Legislature further finds and declares that in the event specific economic, social, 
or other conditions make infeasible such project alternatives or such mitigation 
measures, individual projects may be approved in spite of one or more significant 
effects thereof." [Public Resources Code, section 21002.] 
CEQA contains strong procedural and substantive mechanisms to effectuate these policies. 
Among them are a requirement to prepare environmental analysis, elicit and respond to 
public comment, formulate alternatives and conditions which would lessen the 
environmental effects to acceptable levels, and produce findings and an administrative 
record subject to judicial challenge. 
In essence, CEQA requires a careful review and balancing of environmental and other 
criteria related to a proposed development. In contrast, the Permit Streamlining Act ignores 
all of the environmental, health and safety concerns in CEQA Instead, the only relevant 
issue becomes has the lead agency approved or denied the application within 365 days of 
its submittal. As today's testimony shows the conflicts between CEQA and the PSA 
continue to exist and have arisen recently in the cities of Los Angeles, Sausalito and San 
Diego. 
Existing Time Limits Can Be Unworkable 
The risk faced by local government officials in attempting to fully analyze the consequences 
of complicated development projects is that analysis may take longer than the arbitrary 365-
3 
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timeline. (Please see 
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period for responding to comments 
period for the 
pursuant to lead agency 
EIR by all of the affected 
transportation, parks and recreation, 
to be addressed within from 
The remaining days are available to and a request for 
to interview and select a consultant, and to negotiate a contract and secure the applicant's 
commitment to reimburse the lead agency. hopefully not is some time to 
have the consultant begin preparing the studies which may be necessary to 
perform the CEQA analysis (e.g., modeling, noise assessment, biological inventories 
for endangered species, etc.), to perform the necessary environmental impact analysis, and 
to prepare the administrative draft EIR. 
The existing 365 day limitation not for much flexibility 
approvals or for much time for decision the 
under the best circumstances, there is not much room before the 
hammer for elected officials to weigh the costs and benefits of a 
litigation from both applicants NIMBY s, 
competing interests an impossible 
The PSA's 
environmental 
approved", the ability to condition a 
ultra vires. The applicants' 
environment is at 
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There are only two ways to this Either the legislature must adopt a 
brightline rule that no project can deemed without the completion of '"''-'''-J£1 
and a reasonable period of time within which to approve or deny the project once the 
environmental consequences of the project are or the deemed approved rule must 
be modified to toll the approval and to include all of the mitigations recommended in the 
CEQA analysis. 
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December 17, 1991 
Senate Local Government Committee 
Marian Bergeson, Chairwoman 
Room 2085, State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 94248 
Re: AB 2223 and Problems with the Permit 
Streamlining Act Generally 
Dear Senator Bergeson: 
GEORGANNA FOONDOS 
LAND USE ANALYST 
AB 2223 is an important bill that would significantly improve 
the Permit Streamlining Act ("PSA") (Gov. Code,§ 65920 et seq.) by 
ensuring that "development projects" are not "deemed approved" 
prior to completion of negative declarations or environmental 
impact reports ("EIRs") required by the California Environmental 
Quality Act ("CEQA") (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). In 
its current form, PSA has been understood, at least by Superior 
Courts throughout the State, to allow development projects to be 
deemed approved before anyone fully understands their environmental 
consequences, and before the formulation and imposition of 
reasonable, feasible mitigation measures. As will be discussed 
below, "automatic approval" in such situations can have dire 
environmental consequences. 
For example, the Marin County Superior Court ordered the City 
of Sausalito to issue permits for a project in precisely in the 
form proposed by the applicants, even though the California 
Department of Transportation ("Caltrans"), in EIR comments, warned 
1 
that the project, to be located on a hillside north of the 
Golden Gate, could increase the likelihood of a landslide onto U.S. 
Highway 101, with possible loss of life. Because AB 2223 should 
reduce the chances that sirnil absurd situations will occur in 
the future, the bill should be approved and sent to the Senate 
Floor. 1 
Although the legislation at hand will improve PSA, the Senate 
Local Government Committee should have no illusion that the Act 
will not need subsequent amendments to address different problems. 
The difficulty of reconciling PSA with CEQA requirements is by no 
means the only problem with the Act. PSA also conflicts with a 
number of aspects of the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov. Code, § 
65000 et seq.) and the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et 
seq. ) . More fundamental, however, is the conflict between the 
concept of automatic approval and the federal and state 
due process rights of landowners affected by such s. It is 
unclear whether this conflict can be resolved at all. If it 
cannot, the statute (and the concept of automatic approval) must 
give way to the federal and state constitutions. Thus, the 
Legislature should begin to consider substituting another approach 
for ensuring or at least quick agency action on 
proposed development projects. 
This endorsement does not suggest, however, that the language 
of the bill could not use some minor tinkering. In particular, 
proposed Section 2 of the bill is ambiguous and unclear, and should 
be tightened before the bill becomes law. 
2 
BASIC PROVISIONS OF PSA 
PSA was enacted in order to prevent what the Legislature 
considered to have been unacceptable delays in processing 
applications for "development projects." (See Gov. Code, § 65928. ) 2 
Under the statute, public agencies' failure to either approve or 
deny such projects within specified timelines will cause the 
projects to be deemed approved by operation of law, subject to 
certain qualifications discussed below. (Gov. Code, § 65950.) 
PSA time requirements apply to all applications for 
development projects filed with cities, counties, and all other 
local and state public agencies, except the California Energy 
Commission in its function of siting certain power plant 
facilities. The act does not apply, though, to "administrative 
2
/ "Development" is defined in Government Code section 65927 to 
include the following, both on land or in or under water: the 
placement or erection of any solid material or structure; discharge 
or disposal of any dredged material or of any gaseous, liquid, 
solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing, dredging, mining, or 
extraction of any materials; change in the density or intensity of 
use of land, including subdivisions and other land divisions except 
when done in connection with a public agency's purchase of land for 
recreational use; change in the intensity of use of water, or of 
access thereto; construction, reconstruction, demolition, or 
alteration of the size of any structure, including any facility of 
any private, public, or municipal utility; and the removal or 
harvesting of major vegetation other than for agricultural 
purposes, kelp harvesting, and timber operations pursuant to a 
timber harvesting plan. ''Structures" are defined to include "any 
building, road, pipe, flume, conduit, siphon, aqueduct, telephone 
line, and electrical power transmission and distribution line." 
(Gov. Code, § 65927.) 
In applying the concept of "development," at least one Court 
of Appeal decision declined to extend it to a situation that did 
not seem to be "development" in the common meaning of the word. 
(Meridian Ocean Systems, Inc. v. California State Lands Commission 
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 153, 167 [271 Cal.Rptr. 445] (PSA did not 
apply to permits for underwater geophysical testing designed to 
ascertain the character of ocean floor).) 
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appeals within a state or local agency or to a state or local 
agency." (Gov. Code, § 65922; 
and Savi Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1 
~~~~----~'-~--------
1612-1618 [ 285 
Cal.Rptr. 699].) 
Significantly, the term "development project," as used in PSA, 
does not apply to proposed agency actions that are legislative or 
quasi-legislative in character, such as requests for general plan 
amendments and zoning changes. Nor does the term embrace agency 
actions that are ministerial in nature. Rather, the statute 
applies only to requests for quasi-adjudicatory actions such as 
approvals of tentative subdivision maps, use permits, and 
variances. Agencies therefore are under no time pressure to 
respond to proposals for legislative actions, even when such 
requests are presented within multi-part applications that also 
include requests for quasi-adjudicatory actions. ( Gov. Code , § 
65928; Landi v. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 934 [189 
Lands Commission (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 153, 167 [271 Cal.Rptr. 
445]; and Land Waste . Contra Costa ( 1990) 222 
Cal.App.3d 950 [271 Cal.Rptr. 900].) 
Government Code section 65950 is the heart of PSA. It 
provides that, for any development project for which an EIR is 
required, agency action must be taken either approving or denying 
the project within a year after the application has been "received 
and accepted as complete." Government Code section 65957 allows a 
single 90-day extension with the applicant's consent. These two 
sections, however, must be read in conjunction with Government Code 
4 
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section 65956, as well as Public Resources Code sections 21100.2 
and 21151.5 (from CEQA), all of which are discussed below. 
Section 65950 also provides that, for projects for which a 
negative declaration will suffice, or which are exempt from CEQA 
review altogether, agency action must occur within six months, 
"unless the project proponent requests an extension of the time 
limit." The statute does not expressly limit how long such an 
extension can be. In many situations, the opportunity to request 
such an extension may benefit an applicant, who may be faced with 
the dilemma of either going past the ostensible deadline for 
approving a negative declaration or accepting the need to prepare 
a full EIR. Again, though, this aspect of section 65950 must be 
read in conjunction with Government Code section 65956 and Public 
Resources Code sections 21100.2 and 21151.5. 
PSA/CEQA INTERFACE 
The interface between PSA and CEQA is extremely complex; and 
in applying the two statutory schemes together, interested parties 
are confronted with ambiguities, seeming inconsistencies, and legal 
and practical difficulties. Unfortunately, these problems can only 
be resolved either by legislative amendments or further litigation. 
The two CEQA provisions referenced above (sections 21100.2 and 
21151.5) apply to all projects "involving the issuance to a person 
of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for 
use by one or more public agencies." Because this list of projects 
includes some that are not "development projects" within the 
meaning of PSA, the two sections from CEQA apply to a larger 
5 
universe of activities than PSA does. Still, all projects subject 
to PSA are also subject to the two CEQA sections. 
Sections 21100.2 and 21151.5 state and local 
to establish time limits by which EIRs are completed and certified 
within one year, and negative declarations are completed within 105 
days. The two statutes also allow for an unspecified "reasonable 
extension of the time period in the event that compel! 
circumstances justify additional time and the project applicant 
consents thereto. " Although the statutes do not provide any 
express limitations on how long such extensions may be, Government 
Code section 65950.1 requires that, where such extensions have been 
granted, the lead agency must approve or deny the project within 90 
days after the EIR has been certified. That 90-day period, 
however, may be subject to a single additional 90-day extension; 
Government Code section 65957 can be read to allow such an 
extension, although the statute is not a model of clarity. 
When one reads Public Resources Code sections 21100.2 and 
21151.5 together with Government Code section 65950, it becomes 
clear that a lead agency cannot satisfy PSA simply by satisfying 
the two CEQA sections. Under section 65950, a lead agency must 
approve or deny a project within a year after an application is 
accepted as complete, whereas under the two Public Resources Code 
sections the obligation is only to certify an EIR within that same 
time period. Certification, of course, is not the same as project 
approval. (See CEQA Guidelines, § 15090.) 3 Thus, when dealing 
3
/ The CEQA Guidelines are found in Title 14 of the California 
Code of Regulations, commencing with section 15000. 
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with a "development project," a lead agency must be sure not only 
to certify a project's EIR within a year, but also to take action 
approving or denying the project. 
For projects that are either exempt from CEQA or can be 
approved with a negative declaration, reading the various statutes 
together presents even more difficulties. As noted above, 
Government Code section 65950 requires that, for development 
projects exempt from CEQA or subject only to negative declarations, 
lead agencies must take action approving or denying the projects 
within six months after the applications are accepted as complete, 
unless the applicants seek extensions. In contrast, sections 
21100.2 and 21151.5, which do not apply to exempted projects, 
merely require lead agencies to complete negative declarations 
within 105 days. There is no requirement to actually approve 
projects within any time frame; and extensions are only allowed 
under "compelling circumstances," as described above. Moreover, as 
with the requirement to complete and certify an EIR within a year, 
there is no penalty provided for failure to complete a negative 
declaration within 105 days. The requirement, then, may only be 
"directory" rather than "mandatory," and may therefore be 
unenforceable. (See Meridian Ocean Systems, Inc. v. California 
State Lands Commission (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 153, 168 [271 
Cal. Rptr. 445] . ) 
If the statutes are read literally, moreover, an applicant for 
a development project subject to a negative declaration may be 
willing to waive the six-month time limit under section 65950 but 
find an agency unwilling to grant an extension pursuant to section 
7 
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21100.2 and 21151.5, which require "compelling circumstances" to 
justify variance from statutory time limits. Such a result would 
be anomalous, to be sure, but would be consistent with the 
statutory language. For the contrary result to occur, an icant 
would have to be able, essentially, to demand that an extension be 
granted pursuant to the two CEQA sections. 
It is not clear what happens if, for development projects 
requiring EIRs, extensions based on "compelling circumstances" 
pursuant to sections 21100.2 and 21151.5 go beyond the deadlines of 
six months, one year, and fifteen months (one year plus 90 days) 
set by sections 65950 and 65957. One view is that such extensions 
operate wholly separate from those deadlines, and that, where there 
really are "compelling circumstances," no real deadlines apply, 
except for the need to take final action within 90 days of 
certifying an EIR. (See Gov. Code, section 65950.1.) Another view 
is that fifteen months represents the absolute deadline for final 
action pursuant to PSA. 
Things become even more complex when section 65950 is read in 
conjunction with section 65956, which provides that automatic 
approval can occur "only if the public notice required by law has 
occurred." This requirement was added in 1987 after the Court of 
Appeal issued Palmer v. ( 1986) 178 Cal. .3d 280 [223 
Cal.Rptr. 542], which held that automatic approval could occur even 
if property owners adjacent to the project sites in question had 
been given no opportunity to voice their concerns at a public 
hearing. (As will be discussed below, the opposite conclusion was 
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reached in a more recent decision, Selinger v. City Council (1989) 
216 Cal.App.3d 259, 271-274 [264 Cal.Rptr. 499].) 
As amended, section 65956 creates two strategies by which 
applicants can attempt to force agencies to hold public hearings. 
Subdivision (a) provides that, for development projects for which 
public hearings are required but for which none has been scheduled 
as of 60 days prior to the expiration of the time periods of 
section 65950, the applicant or his or her representative may file 
a legal action compelling the lead agency to "provide the public 
notice or hold the hearing, or both." Applicants, then, can force 
the agencies to give affected property owners the chance to be 
heard. 
The practical effects of subdivision (b), which provides 
another option, are much less clear. The subdivision states that 
"the permit shall be deemed approved only if the public notice 
required by law has occurred," but then describes a kind of "public 
notice" that differs substantially from that which is contemplated 
in subdivision (a). Rather than notify interested persons of a 
pending public hearing, the "public notice" described in 
subdivision (b) may be provided by the applicant, not the agency, 
and may simply state that the project will be deemed approved if 
the agency does not act within 60 days. Before publishing such 
notice, the applicant must provide seven days advance notice to the 
agency, apparently so that the publication may prove to be 
unnecessary. Once the notice is published, the agency then has 
sixty days in which to act on the project. Such notice, then, is 
apparently intended to give the agency one last chance to act, and 
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to inform interested and affected persons of the need to ensure 
that the agency does so. (Ciani Trust and S 
Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1604, 1609, 1618-1620 [285 Cal.Rptr. 
699] . ) 
Both subdivisions (a) and (b) must be read in 1 of 
subdivision (c), which states that "[n]othing in this section shall 
diminish the permitting agency's legal responsibility to provide, 
where applicable, public notice and hearing before acting on a 
permit application." 
What remains unclear is whether, if the agency fails to act 
within 60 days after an applicant provides the "public notice" 
authorized by subdivision (b), the mere notice of pending automatic 
approval has allayed the constitutional concerns raised in the 
Sel~~er decision. In that case, which is described in more detail 
below, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District rejected the 
Second District's decision in Palmer, supra, and concluded that the 
absence of a public hearing deprived property owners adjacent to 
the project area of their constitutional right to be heard. 
§~linger interpreted section 65956 before it was amended in 1987, 
and thus did not directly address the question of whether those 
amendments cured the identified constitutional problem. It is 
unclear whether the due process rights of those property owners can 
be adequately protected simply by an applicant publishing a notice 
stating that an agency had better take action soon or face the 
consequences. Although the Court stated, in dicta, that "[t]he 
recent amendments to the Permit Streamlining Act ... resolve the 
constitutional issue for all current applications," the Court may 
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have mistakenly interpreted subdivision (b) 
notice and a public hearing, rather than 
automatic approval could occur within 60 days. 
265, fn. 3, 274, fn. 8 [264 Cal.Rptr. 499].) 
CASE LAW INTERPRETING PSA 
as requiring both 
simply notice that 
(216 Cal.App.3d at 
Two recent published Court of Appeal opinions addressing 
issues arising under PSA merit extended discussion. In Selin~er, 
supra, a developer filed an action against a city seeking a court 
order declaring that his tentative tract map for a 260-acre parcel 
was approved by operation of law. The city had failed to take 
action on the developer's project (for which an EIR was to be 
prepared) within a year of the date on which the application had 
been accepted as complete. Interpreting Government Code section 
65956 before it was amended in 1987, the Court of Appeal denied the 
requested relief, holding that, in the absence of a public hearing 
on the proposed project, automatic approval would 
unconstitutionally deprive adjacent landowners of their right to be 
heard on the city's quasi-adjudicatory decision. 
When this case arose, as noted above, section 65956 included 
no provision requiring that any kind of public hearing be held, or 
that "public notice" be provided, before automatic approval 
occurred. In Palmer, supra, which interpreted the former statute, 
the Court of Appeal for the Second District had held that such as 
scheme was constitutional. In so concluding, the Court reasoned, 
in effect, that a local agency should not profit by its own 
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failures, regardless of the harsh effect on adjacent property 
owners. 
In Se:I:inger, however, the Court of for the Fourth 
District reached the opposite conclusion, relying primarily on Horn 
v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718], in 
which the California Supreme Court held that a tentative 
subdivision map could not be approved automatically under the 
Subdivision Map Act without a public hearing, because such a result 
deprived adjacent property owners of their constitutional right to 
be heard. Applying the logic of Horn to the facts of its own case, 
the Fourth District concluded that such persons' constitutional 
rights were similarly violated when automatic approval occurred 
under PSA in the absence of a public hearing. In other words, 
section 65956, being only a statute, had to give way to 
constitutional due process requirements. (216 Cal.App.3d at 272-274 
[264 Cal.Rptr. 499].) 
On its face, the Court's conclusion may now seem to be 
primarily of academic interest because, despite the holding in 
Palmer in 1986, the Legislature in 1987 amended section 65956. As 
noted above, however, it remains unclear whether those amendments 
remedy the constitutional problem identified by the Selinger court. 
In stating in a footnote, in dicta, that the amendments had solved 
the problem, the Court referred to its own interpretation of the 
amendments, which apparently read subdivision (b) to require 
applicants to provide both notice and a public hearing, not merely 
notice that the project could be automatically approved even 
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without a hearing. (216 Ca1.App.3d at 265, fn. 3, 274, fn. 8 [264 
Cal. Rptr. 499] . ) 
Probably the most important PSA case issued to date, and the 
only extant published case directly addressing the 1987 amendments, 
is Ciani v. San Diego Trust and Savings Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 
1604 [ 285 Cal. Rptr. 699] . 4 Most significantly, the opinion 
suggests that automatic approvals under the Act remain subject to 
whatever administrative appellate procedures would normally apply 
to projects directly approved or denied by an agency decisionmaking 
body. 
Ciani involved a coastal development permit granted by the 
City of San Diego ("City") acting as the California Coastal 
Commission's "delegated local agency" for administering local 
coastal permits under the California Coastal Act. (See Pub. 
Resources Code, § 30600.5.) Under Public Resources Code section 
30603 (of the Coastal Act), the City's decisions on such permits 
were normally appealable to the Commission. In holding that even 
automatic approvals remained subject to such appeals, the Court 
cited the interests of "third party contestants" in language that 
would seem to apply in other contexts, such as local proceedings in 
which planning commission approvals or denials are appealable to a 
city council or board of supervisors. (233 Cal.App.3d at 1615 [285 
Cal. Rptr. 699] . ) 
4
/ The losing party in Ciani filed a petition for review with the 
California Supreme Court. The petition was denied. The State's 
highest court therefore is aware of the holding in Ciani, and 
declined either to reverse it or "depublish" the opinion. 
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In Ciani, the Court of Appeal held that two permits issued by 
the City were invalid due to noncompliance with PSA and certain 
Coastal Act provisions. The coastal development permit, as well as 
a demolition permit issued by the City pursuant to its municipal 
code, would have allowed the destruction of four historic 
properties within an area of La Jolla known as the "Green Dragon 
Colony." The City had granted the two permits in settlement of a 
PSA lawsuit filed by the applicant (a trust), which complained that 
the City had taken no action for more than a year after the 
applications were filed. The Coastal Commission and an individual 
plaintiff urged that demolition should not proceed until the 
Commission reviewed the coastal development permit. The property 
owner had commenced demolition on the same day the City issued the 
permit. (233 Cal.App.3d at 1610 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].) 
Prior to filing its suit, the landowner had sent a letter to 
the City's planning director in accordance with the seven-
notice provision of Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b). 
Such notice warned the City that the trust intended to invoke what 
it perceived to be its rights under PSA. Seven days later, the 
trust caused a public notice to be sent to neighboring landowners 
and interested parties, specifying that, unless the City acted on 




No copy of the notice, however, was sent to the 
Cal.App.3d at 1609-1610, 1617, 1620 [285 
After waiting more than 60 days without action by the City, 
the trust filed the lawsuit that resulted in the issuance of the 
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coastal development permit and demolition permit. Only on the day 
of issuance was the Commission notified of either the danger or 
reality of automatic approval. (233 Cal.App.3d at 1617 (285 
Cal.Rptr. 699].) Before the Court of Appeal, the Commission argued 
that the coastal development permit could not have become effective 
for at least ten days after the City issued it, since such a period 
was allowed for appeal pursuant to Public Resources Code section 
30603. The trust argued that no right of appeal existed at all for 
automatic approvals; as a fallback, though, it urged that, if such 
a right did exist, the 10-day appeal period would have begun to run 
with the expiration of the 60-day period commenced when it filed 
notice pursuant to Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b). 
(Such a period would have expired before the trust filed its 
lawsuit. ) The Commission argued that the 10-day appeal period 
could commence only when an applicant successfully compels issuance 
of a permit (i.e., through litigation). 
1616 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].) 
(233 Cal.App.3d at 1614-
The Court agreed with the Commission that a right to appeal 
exists, but agreed with the trust that the 10-day period should 
start on the date of automatic approval--without the need for legal 
action to compel issuance of the permit. Still, though, no appeal 
period can commence until the appellate body is notified of the 
automatic approval, as expressly required by the Commission's 
regulations for permits approved by delegated local agencies. In 
this case, the trust never provided any such notice. Thus, because 
the Commission first learned of the automatic approval on July 10, 
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1991, the appeal period continued through July 20th. (233 
Cal.App.3d at 1616-1618 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].) 
In holding that even permits approved of PSA 
remained subject to appeal to the Commission, the Court zed 
the rights of affected third parties, implicitly echoing the due 
process concerns addressed in Sel~~ger: 
"Where the permit is obtained by the 'deemed approved' 
mechanism of the Streamlining Act, the parties in 
opposition are effectively prevented from presenting a 
case. If a provision for appeal is appropriate following 
the hearing and appearance procedures which attend the 
typical method of permit grant, it would seem even more 
necessary when considered in light of a 'deemed approved' 
permit. If appellate rights were considered extinguished 
as the result of the City's inaction, the City could by 
such inaction deprive third party contestants of all 
opportunity to object at a public hearing. We cannot 
believe this to have been the intent of the Streamlining 
Act." 
(233 Cal.App.3d at 1615 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].) 
The Court of Appeal next addressed the question of whether the 
trust, in issuing its public notice of imminent automatic approval 
absent action by the City, had adequately complied with the terms 
of Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b). The Court 
reasoned that, although the content of the notice issued by the 
trust was adequate, the trust should have distributed the notice to 
the Commission. The statute expressly requires that an applicant 
issuing the notice comply with the "distribution requirements under 
applicable provisions of law." The Court interpreted this phrase 
to require notice to whatever persons and entities might be 
entitled to notice of potential agency action on the permits in 
question. For the demolition permit, the applicable provisions 
were found in the San Diego Municipal Code. For the coastal 
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development permit, the Commission regulations governed. Although, 
according to the Court, the trust "appears to have complied with 
many of the requirements of the Municipal Code," it did not comply 
with the Commission regulations. Specifically, the Commission 
itself did not receive the notice. Since the Commission never 
received the 60-day notice, the trust never provided the "public 
notice required by law, " which is a prerequisite for automatic 
approval under PSA. The coastal development permit, then, was 
never "deemed approved." (233 Cal.App.3d at 1618-1620 [285 
Cal. Rptr. 699] . ) 
In this last part of the opinion, the Court seemed to assume 
that the phrase "public notice required by law," as found in 
Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b), referred only to 
the kind of notice that an applicant can issue in order to try to 
force agency action within 60 days. (233 Cal.App.3d at 1609, 1618-
1619 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].) The parties apparently did not question 
this assumption, since there had been no City proceedings on the 
coastal development permit prior to which any kind of notice would 
have been given. 
REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH PSA 
The problem with PSA most relevant to AB 2223 is the 
possibility of automatic approval before agencies complete their 
environmental documents and without agencies being able to impose 
reasonable, feasible mitigation measures. A concrete example of 
the dire consequences of such occurrences is evident from the facts 
of a case entitled, Patterson v. City of Sausalito (1 Civil No. 
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A053074), currently on appeal before the Court of Appeal for the 
First District in San Francisco. The project in question would 
involve the construction of residential units on a steep hillside 
uphill from U.S. Highway 101, at the edge of the Golden Gate 
National Recreation Area. 
In that case, the Superior Court held that a developer's 
project was "deemed approved" in precisely the form originally 
proposed by the applicant, despite the fact that a completed EIR 
showed that it would cause numerous significant environmental 
effects, including the following: 
(1) the very real possibility of a landslide on United States 
Highway 101, which, according to Caltrans, could lead to 
loss of life it if occurs during peak commute hours; 
(2) loss of habitat of a federally-listed endangered species 
(the Mission Blue Butterfly); 
( 3) potentially insoluble sewage disposal problems, since the 
project area is not served by sewers and is not well 
suited for conventional septic systems; 
(4) potential for hillside erosion from storm water runoff; 
(5) the risk of fire danger for new residents due to the lack 
of adequate water for fire protection services; and 
(6) visual impacts within the GGNRA. 
Without exception, these impacts could have been diminished or 
avoided if the Superior Court had allowed the City of Sausalito to 
impose mitigation measures. The trial court reasoned, though, that 
the project "deemed approved" was the precise project initially 
sought by the applicant. It is not hard to imagine other scenarios 
with even more absurd results. 
From a policy standpoint, the major question here is whether 
the environment and innocent third persons should be made to pay 
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the price for an agency's slowness in processing an application. 
In the Sausalito example, the environmental impacts could even lead 
to the death of innocent commuters. 
Another major problem with PSA is what to do when applicants 
and agency staff disagree as to whether proposed projects are 
consistent or inconsistent with applicable general plans or zoning 
and subdivision requirements. Sometimes reasonable minds differ as 
to whether projects require legislative actions (e.g., amendments 
to such plans, zoning ordinances, or subdivision ordinances); and 
applicants give themselves the benefit of the doubt by assuming 
that their proposals are consistent. Staff may disagree; but 
unless and until agency decisionmakers have the chance to resolve 
this conflict, the debate remains unresolved. Where projects are 
approved automatically prior to such resolution, they can include 
features inconsistent with governing local ordinances. 
The next major problem with PSA is the question of whether 
even the 1987 amendments, made in response to Palmer, adequately 
protect the procedural due process rights of affected landowners. 
They may not; and the Legislature's eventual response may have to 
be to abandon the whole concept of automatic approval in favor of 
some other mechanism for quickening the approval process. 
To understand the nature of the constitutional issues 
involved, a survey of relevant case law is a helpful way to begin. 
The most important general statements of federal "procedural 
due process" principles in the context of land use decisionmaking 
occur in Hqrn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 615-619 
[156 Cal.Rptr. 718], which was briefly described above. In that 
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seminal decision, which dealt with Subdivision Map Act 
requirements, the California Supreme Court held that the minimal 
notice requirements of CEQA 5 did not the 
constitutional rights of property owners who would be 
"substantially affected" by the approval of a proposed tentative 
subdivision map. 6 As a result, the Court set aside the respondent 
agency's approval of the map, and ordered that improved notice be 
given. 
In so holding, the Court emphasized that affected landowners 
should have been given the opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful 
hearing" prior to agency action on the project. (24 Cal.3d at 618 
[156 Cal.Rptr. 718] (emphasis added).) In support of the principle 
that a "predeprivation hearing" be "meaningful," the Court cited 
two landmark procedural due process cases: Beaudreau v. Superior 
Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [121 Cal.Rptr. 585]; and Bell v. 
Burson (1981) 402 U.S. 535, 541 [91 S.Ct. 1586].) Although neither 
5
/ In Horn, the defendant county's CEQA notice procedures required 
only the posting of notices in various locations and the mailing of 
notice to persons who had specifically requested such notice. From 
a constitutional standpoint, such notice was not "reasonably 
calculated to afford affected persons the realistic opportunity to 
protect their interests," although it may have been adequate "to 
encourage the generalized public participation in the environmental 
decision making contemplated by CEQA." (24 Cal.3d at 617-618 [156 
Cal.Rptr. 718].) 
6 I In Horn, the plaintiff adjacent landowner urged that his 
property would be "substantially affected" by the proposed 
subdivision because it would "substantially interfere with his use 
of the only access from his parcel to the public streets, and 
[would] increase both traffic congestion and air pollution." The 
Court held that, "[f]rom a pleading standpoint, plaintiff has thus 
adequately described a deprivation sufficiently 'substantial' to 




case involved land use decisionmaking, both cases articulate 
standards that necessarily apply in that context. 
In Beaudreau, the California Supreme Court quoted the United 
States Supreme Court's statement in Bell that "' [i]t is a 
proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing 
which excludes consideration of an element essential to the 
decision . . does not meet this standard.'" (14 Cal.3d at 458 
[121 Cal.Rptr. 585] (emphasis added).) In another federal case, 
Armstrong v. Manzo (1965) 380 U.S. 545, 552 [85 S.Ct. 1187], the 
Supreme Court emphasized that the "opportunity to be heard" must be 
granted "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 7 
7 I In Beaudreau, the Court held that procedural due process 
principles were ated by former Government Code sections 947 and 
951, which allowed defendant public agencies to require plaintiffs 
to post undertakings as security against court costs that might 
ultimately be awarded to the agencies. The Court explained that "a 
due process hearing would necessarily inquire into the merit of the 
plaintiff's action as well as into the reasonableness of the amount 
of the undertaking in light of the defendant's probable expenses." 
(14 Cal.3d at 460-462 (121 Cal.Rptr. 585].) 
In Bel~, the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed a similar issue. 
The Court struck down as unconstitutional a Georgia statute 
requiring the suspension of the driver's licenses of uninsured 
motorists involved in accidents unless such motorists posted 
undertakings during litigation filed against them. The statute was 
defective because it did not require a hearing on the possibility 
that the motorists would be held liable prior to depriving them of 
their licenses or requiring the undertakings. (402 U.S. at 540 [91 
s.ct. 1586].) 
In Armstrong, the Court held that Texas had violated the due 
process rights of the natural father of a child whom the husband of 
his ex-wife wanted to adopt. Under the state court procedures, the 
natural father had been provided no notice of the pre-adoption 
hearing; and this defect was not cured by his ability to obtain a 
post-adoption hearing at which he had the burden to prove the 
incorrectness of the original decision. (380 U.S. at 551-552 [85 
S. Ct. 118 7] . ) 
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In 1986, as noted above, the Second Appellate District issued 
its problematic holding in Palmer v , which concluded that, 
despite the reasoning of Horn, section 65956 as originally drafted 
was not unconstitutional even though projects could " 
approved" in the absence of any public hearing at which affected 
property owners could voice their concerns. 
In 1989, in Selinger v. City Council, the Fourth 
District, interpreting the same (now outdated) code section, 
reached the opposite conclusion, finding the reasoning of Palmer to 
be absolutely irreconcilable with that of Horn: 
"The Palmer court concluded, 'In the matter before us, City's 
failure to follow Horn may not be used by City to invalidate 
legislative enactments in any way inconsistent with the 
procedural due process considerations involved in Horn.' (Id., 
at p. 292, original italics.) 
"The Palmer court relied heavily on its perception that 
the failure to provide notice was the fault of the local 
government. The Palmer court apparently overlooked the Horn 
court's discussion of the automatic approval provisions which 
appear in the Subdivision Map Act: '[T]he due process 
requirements discussed herein are not rooted in statute but 
are compelled by the stronger force of constitutional 
principle.' (Horn, supra 24 Cal.3d at p. 616.) 
"As in Horn, automatic approval of Sel 's tentative 
tract map could lead to substantial deprivation of property of 
neighboring landowners. The California Supreme Court held in 
Horn that approval of tentative subdivision maps is 
unconstitutional unless adequate notice and a hearing are 
provided. We see no way to reconcile Palmer with the Horn 
decision. We are duty bound to follow Horn; thus, we 
concluded that the Permit Streamlining Act was 
unconstitutional insofar as it led to approval of applications 
for development without provision for notice and a hearing to 
affected landowners." 
(216 Cal.App.3d at 274 [264 Cal.Rptr. 259] (emphasis added; 
footnoted omitted.) 
Interestingly, in addressing the 1987 amendments to section 
65956, the Selinger court stated, in dicta, that "the recent 
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amendments to the Permit Streamlining Act resolve the 
constitutional issue for all current applications for development." 
(216 Cal.App.3d at 274, fn. 8 [264 Cal.Rptr. 259].) This 
statement, though, assumes that "the Legislature amended section 
65956 to include a requirement of notice to the public and a 
hearing." (216 Cal.App.3d at 265, fn. 3 [264 Cal.Rptr. 259] 
(emphasis added). ) Thus, to the extent that the term "public 
notice required by law" in section 65956, subdivision (b), can be 
understood to require only notice, but not a hearing, such an 
interpretation would be unconstitutional according to Selinger. 8 
In light of the reasoning in Horn and Selinger, the question 
of the whether an agency has issued the "public notice required by 
law" is inseparable from the question of whether the hearing for 
which the notice was given actually provided affected property 
owners' a "meaningful" opportunity "to be heard. " If no such 
linkage is made, then an interpretation of PSA by which "automatic 
approval" could occur as long as mere notice by an agency, without 
a meaningful hearing, has been given, would clearly be 
unconstitutional. In other words, simple "notice" by itself cannot 
protect the procedural due process rights of affected landowners, 
8
/ Unless it was just a misreading of the words of the statute, 
the Seling~~ court's reading of the 1987 amendments undoubtedly 
reflects the principle that "remedial" amendments (i.e., those 
attempting to cure a perceived defect in the original statute), 
"must be liberally construed so as to effectuate [their] object and 
purpose, and to suppress the mischief at which [they were] 
directed. " (California State Restaurant Association v. Whitlow 
(1976) 58 Ca1.App.3d 340, 347 [129 Cal.Rptr. 824]; see also Cit~ 
SanJose v. Forsythe (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 114, 117 [67 Cal.Rptr. 
754] and Lande v. Jurisich (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 613, 616-617 [139 
P.2d 657]. 
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who have a right to be heard. " The notice must relate to a 
the decision" at hand. (Armstrong, 
S. Ct. 1187]; Beaudreau, supra, 14 Cal. 3d at 458 [ 121 Cal 
585]; Bell, supra, 402 U.S. at 542 [91 s.ct. 1586]; see also~~ 
supra, 24 Cal.3d at 618 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718].) 
It is unclear whether a hearing held prior to completion of an 
EIR or negative declaration can be constitutionally ''meaningful." 
Arguably, such a hearing does not occur at a "meaningful time," and 
cannot address all "element[s] essential to the [lead agency's] 
decision." In situations in which automatic approval is a 
realistic possibility, affected landowners should be made aware of 
that very danger so that they "can be heard" on the question of how 
such a draconian result can be avoided. In the absence of a public 
hearing held after this possibility becomes public knowledge, 
automatic approval based on "public notice required by law" issued 
for previous hearings is constitutional problematic. 
In other words, short of a hearing on the merits of 
a project may not be constitutionally meaningful. An affected 
landowner's "right to be heard" may be meaningless unless he or she 
is addressing decisionmakers who the power to act on what is 
said. 9 That power, of course, must include the power to deny a 
project--even if more than six months or a year has passed since 
9
/ By analogy, a defendant who can only argue his case after he 
has been convicted of a crime has been accorded due process. 
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Under this analysis, PSA timelines can do little more than 




testimony and, if they desire, or condition the 
Any kind of automatic approval which occurs 
landowners being given a fair chance to 
interests, may be unconstitutional. 
In light of these considerations, the Legislature should 
abandon the concept of automatic approval in favor of an approach 
by which agencies are forced to act on projects--approving, 
conditioning, or denying them--within a reasonable time period. 
Such a reform would end the gamesmanship that often occurs 
currently, by which applicants often cooperate with agencies while 
deadlines pass (even contributing to such delay themselves), then 
lie in wait to demand automatic approval if local politics begin to 
shift against them, or if agency decisionmakers indicate a desire 
to impose mitigation measures the applicants do not like. 
A reformed PSA without automatic approval would still serve 
the primary goal of the original statute: forcing agencies to reach 
decisions on projects within a reasonable time frame. 
statute already serves this function to a degree. 
The existing 
By providing 
notice of potential automatic approval pursuant to Government Code 
section 65956, subdivision (b), an applicant can force an agency to 
take final action within 60 days, as the Ciani decision held. 
Under such proposed reforms, a lead agency would still 
maintain ultimate control over the form of a project, which could 
be approved, conditioned, or denied. What many development 
interests have argued for (effectively so far, at least in the 
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Superior Courts) is the of that control, whereby, as 
punishment for an slowness in an ication, 
an applicant is rewarded being her ultimate wish: 
the project in preci the form 
noted above, the recent 
in the 
of the Ci 
ication. As 
of Sausalito 
demonstrates the absurd consequences of such an approach. If 
upheld 
unlikely), 
the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court 
such a pol would require 
which appears 
to complete 
surrender their police power, ess of the consequences, as a 
penalty for not moving quickly enough. The Legislature could save 
years of litigation by solving these problems legislatively in the 
near future. 
CONCLUSION 
the Court quoted a commentator who " 
observed" that"' [l]aid almost upon a heap of existing 
rules, the changes [of the Permit Streaml Act] set up a chain 
reaction of statutory conflicts that continues (Wilson, 
Down Stream from Streaml 
Cal.App.3d at 267, fn. 5 [2 
(Aug. 1987) Cal.Law. 67, 68.)" (216 
Cal.Rptr. 499].) The commentator 
should have added reference to "constitutional conflicts" as well. 
The Legislature should begin rethinking its whole approach to 
forcing agency action on deve ects. AB 2223 would be a 
big improvement to PSA, in that the bill should he to reduce the 
frequency of horror stories such as the one from the Sausalito 
litigation described above. The bill, though, would do nothing to 
address the existing statute's constitutional problems. In coming 
to grips with that more fundamental problem, Legislature has 
26 
two choices: either to let the courts continue to interpret the 
Act, and then see what's left; or to go back to the board 
to come up with a way to balance the 's 
for quick action on projects with the myriad other considerations 
touched on above. 
Sincerely, 
L, 
James G. Moose 
1120301.003 
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COASTAL AREA SUPPORT TEAM 
1 0 December 1 991 
Senate Committee on Local Government 
P.O. Box 94246 
Sacramento, California 94248-0001 
RE: AB 2223 PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT 
Honorable Ms. Marian Bergeson and Committeemembers: 
COAST members and directors are concerned about the 
disharmony between the Permit Streamling Act and the 
California Environmental Quality Act. 
We are a non-profit corporation comprised of activists and 
representatives of community associations from Santa Monica 
to Weschester along Lincoln Boulevard. We have witnessed 
the divisive effect of these conflicting statutes with the 
proposed Blanchard project. 
On one hand, COAST recognizes the concerns of developers who 
risk time and money when entering into a building project. 
There are many uncertainties. Whert a municipality fails in 
its responsibility to act in a timely manner in approving a 
project, it adds an unwarranted burden. PSA gives 
developers some protection against this. 
On the other hand, COAST sees that the public must be 
informed and protected from the harmful effects of proposed 
developments. CEQA ensures this protection. 
COAST urges that these two statutes be harmonized. 
Developers, municipalities, and the public are partners 
working for positive community growth. To work together, we 
need to have one set of rules. 
For those parties who would argue that AB 2223 is 
unnecessary because litigation is a remedy, COAST says 
"hogv1ash". We know from personal experience that litigation 
is costly and time-consuming. It is a remedy that is out of 
reach for most of the public. Moreover, it drives the 
public and developers apart, when they should be working in 
partnership to build the best community possible. 
4777 La Villa Marina 
Marina del Rey, California 90292 
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COAST fully supports the effort to 





Debra T_,. Bov1en, 
Counsel 
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CHI'.IRWOMAN. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & WASTE MANAGEMENT CO~MITTEF 
VICE CHAIRWOMAN. COMMERCE. ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE 
MEMBER. PLANNING & LAND USE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
:10:1 
Hon. Marian Bergeson Page 2 
Your briefing paper suggests three [X)ssible to resolving the 
heretofore ambiguous relationship ~:tween tne California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA) and tne Permit Streamlining Act, (PSA): requiring 
CEQA to be completed first, requiring adherence to the same deadlines, 
or tolling the deadlines until all local legislative decisions 
pertaining to the applicat.ion are completed. ~ original request to 
Assemblywoman Noore basically supported the first of these 
alternatives, and I still feel it addresses the issue at hand most 
directly. 
In my request to Assembl jl'NCman Moore, I suggested a simple concept: 
complete the CEQA review and certification prior to confirmation of 
"deemed approved" status under tnP PSA. This would allow for 
simultaneous rLmning of the CEQA and PSA clocks (not sequential 
running, as some critics feared the prorusal implied), and prompt 
issuance of the automatic permit approvals if the PSA deadlines had 
expired by the time the CEQA review was ccrnpleted. I believe there is 
still validity in this interpretation of my proposal and AB 2223, as 
approved by the Assembly, appears to be consistent with it. 
Argume.nts that m:mdatory CEQA compliance prior to imposition of the PSA 
provide an opporbmi ty for local jurisdictions to abuse the PSA could 
be addressed rather straightforwardly, but such ru~ approach is not 
without drawbacks. By combining CEQA compliance with some absolute 
Cleadljncs for completion of the CEQA process and the threat of "deemed 
certification," an element. of certainty could be injected into the 
concept. For example, one russible approach vvould be to impose PSA's 
90-day extension limit on CEQA compliance, with an 
certification tmder CEQA to follow failure to compJete separate CEQA 
certification within the 15-month period. This vvould then coincide 
th issuance of the autor!lc>tic pennit approval under PSI•,. 
Hcwever, this would essf:ntially formalize (and codify) the type of 
situation that gave rise to the legislation before you, i.n which the 
City fai1ed to ccrnplete its environmental review of a contxoversial 
development. Luckily, this particuJar project was in the Coastal Zone, 
so there was another agency (the Coastal Carnmission) effiFDWered to 
provide furtner scrutiny. 
The basic proble..m with absolute deadlines for CEQA review j s that 
schedules should not take precedence over protection of the environment. 
Court decisions regarding the PSA have left the resolution of these 
issues to the legislative process you have undertaken. I do not 
believe that CCliT'mtmi ty interests or developnent interests are well 
served by the current art1biguous situation. Developers are not provided 
sufficient certainty of process and protection against costly 
1itiqation, and camnmities have little recourse except litigation over 
procedural issues which should be resolved once and for all through 
precise legislative action. Ad:Utionally, our overburde.ned courts can 
Hon. Mariall Bergeson 
do without more potential1y fruitless litigation 





AB 2223 should be approved retaining first altE:n1ative outlined in 
tht· briefing paper. Its passage will pennit disputes over developnent 
proposals such as 6 01 Ocean Front Walk to focus on the merits of the 
proposals. That i~: where the focus belongs. I hope you will move this 
legislation forward in that positive spirit, to the benefit of all 
concerned. 
Thank you for considering my views. 
~~ /) /7 -,;}-· 









FRIENDS OF WESTWOOD, INC. 
A Nonprofit Tax-Exempt Corporation 
December 16, 1991 
Senate Subcommittee on Local Government 
Room 112, State Capital 
sacramento, Calif, 94248~0001 
Re: Assembly Bill 2223 (Moore), Permit Streamlining Act 
Issues 
Honorable Members of the Local Government Senate 
Subcomm!tte, 
Friends of Westwood is a Los Angeles based non profit 
organization concerned with land issues especially as they 
apply to the general Westwood community. The organization 
is comprised of approximately 500-700 households. 
Friends of Westwood supports the above referenced proposed 
legislation. Implementation of the proposed legislation 
will allow full disclosure of facts contained within 
environmental documentation, especially an EIR, prior to 
discretionary permits being granted. This will permit a 
much more informed decision making process. Additionally, 
it will allow increased possibilities for an informed public 
and its participation in the decision making process. 
Friends of Westwood has always advocated measures which will 
further an informed and actlve public. 
1015 Gayley Ave., Suite 1063. LA., CA 90024 ** 475-6261 
